In this issue: Discrimination • First Amendment • Individual With Disabilities • Open Meetings Act • Property Valuation • Section 1983 • Sports • Standing • Termination • Title IX
District court grants board of education’s motions for summary judgment on discrimination claims because former students failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants’ deliberate indifference to offensive conduct.
Ball v. Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-2681, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34129 (Feb. 28, 2022).
https://casetext.com/case/ball-v-olentangy-local-sch-dist-bd-of-educ
Two students who formerly attended high school at Olentangy Liberty High School, Jade Davis and Olivia Ball, filed claims that the Olentangy Local (Delaware) School District Board of Education, as well as the high school principal and assistant principal, failed to respond appropriately to racist and discriminatory acts at the school. Davis and Ball, who are Black, described multiple incidents in which they, or other students at the school, had been subjected to racist statements and actions that the district court described as “deeply offensive conduct.” While the school district defendants were not the perpetrators of the conduct, Davis and Ball alleged that they failed to respond in an appropriate way to stop the conduct. Ball also alleged that her teacher in yearbook class discriminated against her based on her disability.
Both Davis and Ball filed complaints alleging race discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act against the board and 14th Amendment complaints under 42 United States Code 1983 against the board and the district employees. Ball filed additional claims of discrimination under Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against all the defendants and a recklessness claim against her former yearbook teacher.
Regarding the Title VI claims against the school involving student-on-student harassment, the court noted that the plaintiffs were required to show that: (1) the harassment was so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; (2) the school had actual knowledge of the harassment; and (3) the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment. The court focused its analysis on the third element and concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the board was deliberately indifferent to the racial harassment the plaintiffs experienced at the school.
Specifically, it held that the district employees’ failure to follow board policy and report all incidents of harassment, without more, did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the defendants promptly addressed each incident brought to their attention and that their responses were reasonably tailored to the findings of each investigation. The board had no reason to believe that its efforts to remediate were ineffective or disproportionate because there were no repeat offenses or offenders. Further, the court held that the board was not liable for its responses to harassment occurring outside of school because it did not exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred. As a result, the court awarded summary judgment on these claims.
The court awarded summary judgment to all defendants on the 14th Amendment claims because the plaintiffs provided insufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the board was deliberately indifferent to racial harassment. The court relied on the analysis it had already conducted regarding the plaintiffs’ Title VI claims. It further held that the district employees were entitled to summary judgment on the 14th Amendment claims because the plaintiffs made no arguments that they were liable under Sec. 1983.
Regarding Ball’s claims under ADA and Sec. 504, the court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants in their personal capacity because there is no individual liability under the ADA. The court stated that Ball had not presented direct evidence of discrimination because she was hospitalized. The court concluded that Ball was required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that she was disabled under the statute; (2) otherwise qualified for participating in a government program; and (3) was excluded from, denied the benefits of or subject to discrimination because of her disability. It focused its analysis on the third element.
The court noted that, under the ADA, Ball was required to present evidence of a but-for relationship between the protested act and her disability. In other words, she was required to present sufficiently significant evidence of animus toward her that was a but-for cause of the discriminatory behavior. Under Sec. 504, Ball was required to show that the school and its employees discriminated against her solely because of her disability. Ball was also required to provide evidence of how the school treated comparable, nondisabled students. The court concluded that Ball did not provide any comparators, and, without comparators, she could not make an indirect showing of discrimination.
Finally, the court granted summary judgment to the district on Ball’s claim of recklessness against a district employee because Ohio law does not recognize a stand-alone cause of action for recklessness.
Federal court rejects claims of age discrimination, sex discrimination and retaliation by employee of joint vocational school district after employee was not hired for three administrative positions within the school.
Wheeler v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr., S.D.Ohio No. 3:20-cv-141, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44206 (Mar. 14, 2022)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6027405868632632431&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
Plaintiff Wheeler was a 58-year-old female teacher at the Miami Valley Career Technical Center (MVCTC) in 2018 when the initial suit was filed. Wheeler was a long-time math instructor within MVCTC. She was certified in several mathematics and science courses and had a principal certification. She also served as the proficiency intervention coordinator, in which she was charged with assisting students who had been struggling with educational material. Wheeler applied for three separate administrative/supervisory positions within MVCTC in quick succession. First, she applied for the position of academic supervisor. She was interviewed but not selected for the position, which eventually went to an external candidate. She then applied for the position of Health and Consumer Sciences supervisor. Again, Wheeler was interviewed but not selected for the position, which went to an internal candidate. The internal candidate was a principal at another building within MVCTC, which created a third opening for which Wheeler applied. Again, she was interviewed but not selected for the position. In all three instances, the position went to a candidate with relevant experience and educational background.
Wheeler filed a claim alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), which dismissed her claims. She then filed suit in state court, and the action was removed to federal court by MVCTC.
The court began by dismissing Wheeler’s age discrimination claim, analyzing the claim through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used in employment disputes, from the case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie case of discrimination based on her “failure to promote” theory requires that she establish that: "(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3) that she was denied the promotion; and (4) that a similarly qualified individual who is not a member of the protected class received the promotion(s) when the plaintiff's request was denied" (Reeves v. Tenn. Mut. Ins. Co., 555 Fed. Appx. 509, 511 (6th Cir. 2014)). If she was able to establish a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the action. If they were able to do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reasons were not the true reasons for the adverse action but were just pretext.
The court found that while Wheeler was able to articulate a prima facie case, MVCTC was able to proffer legitimate reasons for each hire. It was able to do so using affidavits from district officials who discussed the unique qualifications and experience of each of the successful candidates, including relevant certifications and experiences they had either within MVCTC or with previous employers. Wheeler attempted to argue these reasons were pretextual, claiming that MVCTC had an “unofficial policy” of promoting from within. However, the court dismissed this as an unsupported allegation and found no issue of material fact regarding an unofficial policy. The court noted that employers have discretion to choose among qualified candidates for a position and that while Wheeler was a qualified candidate, each successful candidate had qualities she lacked, including administrative experience. The court also rejected the sex discrimination claims on much the same grounds.
Lastly, Wheeler claimed that MVCTC declined to hire her as retaliation for her filing of an EEOC complaint and an Ohio Civil Rights Commission complaint in 2012. The court rejected this claim because Wheeler was unable to establish a causal connection, noting that the recent complaints were of course filed after the adverse action, and there were no facts to establish that MVCTC was retaliating for a complaint she filed.
Ohio district court finds employees likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim after ESC bans controversial messages on clothing.
Fuller v. Warren Cty. Edn. Serv. Ctr., S.D.Ohio No. 1:21-cv-451, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25659 (Feb. 14, 2022).
https://casetext.com/case/fuller-v-warren-cnty-educ-serv-ctr
The plaintiffs were paraprofessionals at Laura Farrell Elementary School (Farrell School), which is operated by the Warren County Educational Service Center (ESC). The ESC supports school districts by meeting the needs of students who require specialized and focused intervention and support. The students at Farrell School have been identified as having severe emotional disabilities.
In the fall of 2020, while working at Farrell School, plaintiffs wore clothing and face masks which communicated social or political messages, including: “Black Lives Matter,” “I Can’t Breathe,” “Unapologetically Black” and “Down with Racism.” In September 2020, an administrator stopped one of the plaintiffs in the hallway of the school and informed him that a parent had called the school and complained about the “Black Lives Matter” T-shirt he was wearing. The administrator told the paraprofessional to be “careful” and “mindful” of what he was wearing.
Around that time, another plaintiff wore a face mask with the message “I Can’t Breathe.” The school nurse complained that she was offended and upset by the mask. An administrator approached the plaintiff and told him that there had been a complaint and asked the plaintiff to remove the mask. The plaintiff complied with the administrator’s request.
Soon thereafter, a third plaintiff wore a T-shirt to school with the phrase “8 minutes — 46 seconds” on it, referring to the length of time George Floyd was restrained by police officers during the incident which led to his death. An administrator informed the plaintiff that someone from the adjacent neighborhood had seen the plaintiff walking close to the school premises while wearing the shirt and called to complain that the T-shirt was offensive and should not be worn in or near a school setting. The administrator told the plaintiff that the school “cannot be political” and instructed the employee to either remove the shirt or wear it inside out. The employee wore the T-shirt inside out to hide its message.
Plaintiffs brought claims against the ESC alleging that its policy which bans employees from wearing any clothes or accessories with controversial social or political messages violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
In reviewing the plaintiffs’ claims, the court applied the following three-step inquiry: 1) whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern; 2) whether the employees spoke as private citizens or as employees pursuant to their official duties; and 3) whether the employees’ speech interest outweighs “the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”
On the issue of whether the employees spoke as citizens on a matter of public concern, the court noted that there was little doubt that the issues raised as part of the “Black Lives Matter” movement and the widespread protests of the killing of George Floyd were matters of significant public concern.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the plaintiffs spoke as private citizens or pursuant to their professional duties. The court held that there was no dispute that the speech was made as private citizens, since making statements regarding the Black Lives Matter movement or the killing of George Floyd were not within the scope of the employees’ duties.
Prior to applying the third step of the inquiry, the court recognized that because plaintiffs were not “exposing any inner workings of their government employer which are of substantial concern to the public,” the balancing test required less of a showing of disruption by the ESC. The district highlighted the fact that a parent, co-worker and community member complained about the messages on the plaintiffs’ apparel as evidence that plaintiffs’ messages interfered with the school’s instructional services. The district also pointed to the volatility of the student population at Farrell School, and the concern that their messages would trigger an outburst from a student.
Although the court acknowledged the ESC’s concerns for safety were “real,” there was nothing in the record that would establish that the ban on controversial messages on clothing and accessories would alleviate those harms in a direct and material way. Nor did the evidence indicate that the plaintiffs’ messages impaired harmony among co-workers or had a detrimental impact on a close working relationship at the Farrell School. The court found nothing in the record that established that the plaintiffs’ clothing would cause harm that was “real, not merely conjectural.” As a result, the court found that the ESC had not met its burden of demonstrating that the challenged policy was necessary to the efficient operation of the Farrell School so as to outweigh the plaintiffs’ interests in commenting upon matters of public concern. Because plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Supreme Court of the United States concludes that public official did not suffer First Amendment retaliation when he was censured by fellow members of the public board on which he serves.
Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 1253, 2022 U.S. Lexis 1671 (2022).
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-804_j426.pdf
David Wilson was elected to the board of trustees for the Houston Community College System (college) in 2013. Over the years, Wilson disagreed with his fellow board members and brought multiple lawsuits challenging the board’s actions. In 2016, the college board reprimanded Wilson publicly. Wilson continued to charge the board with violating its ethics rules and bylaws. At a meeting in 2018, the board adopted a resolution censuring Wilson and stating that his conduct was “not consistent with the best interests of the College” and “not only inappropriate, but reprehensible.” The board penalized Wilson by deeming him ineligible for board positions during 2018.
Following the censure, Wilson amended the pleadings in one of his pending state-court lawsuits against the college to add claims that the censure violated his rights under the First Amendment. The case was removed to federal court. The district court granted the college’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Wilson lacked standing to bring the complaint. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that Wilson did have standing and alleged a viable claim under the First Amendment. It stated that a verbal “reprimand against an elected official for speech addressing a matter of public concern is an actionable First Amendment claim under” 42 United States Code 1983.
The college asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the circuit court’s judgment on the First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Wilson did not have an actionable First Amendment claim arising purely from the college board’s verbal censure.
The court stated that the First Amendment’s prohibition against “abridging the freedom of speech” also prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected speech. Wilson alleged that the censure was an impermissible retaliatory action. The court weighed “long settled and established practice” and concluded that a purely verbal censure by an elected assembly of one of its own members is not an abridgment of the censured member’s speech. Rather, the First Amendment protects free speech “on both sides and for every faction on any side.”
The court stated that, as an elected official, Wilson must be expected to shoulder a degree of criticism about his public service from constituents and peers and continue to exercise his free speech rights when the criticism comes. It held that, because the only adverse action Wilson faced for his speech was itself a form of speech from his colleagues, Wilson could not use the First Amendment as a weapon to silence other representatives seeking to exercise their freedom of speech.
The court stated: “The censure at issue … was a form of speech by elected representatives. It concerned the public conduct of another elected representative. Everyone involved was an equal member of the same deliberative body. … [T]he censure did not prevent Mr. Wilson from doing his job, it did not deny him any privilege of office, and Mr. Wilson does not allege it was defamatory.” As a result, the court held that the board’s censure could not have “materially deterred an elected official like Mr. Wilson from exercising his own right to speak.”
Ohio district court holds that First Amendment does not guarantee a right to compel government officials to act or adopt a citizen’s views.
Perdew v. Gavin, S.D.Ohio No. 1:21-cv-732, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69687 (Apr. 15, 2022).
Edward Perdew emailed the Mason City School District on May 13, 2021, regarding critical race theory and also provided critical race theory “briefings” to the board of education on Oct. 26, 2021, and Nov. 11, 2021. Perdew alleged he received a call from the board president, Charles Garvin, who invited Perdew to discuss his concerns via telephone or a meeting. In response, Perdew emailed the district to “demand public comment on the district’s position on Critical Race Theory.” On Dec. 7, 2021, Perdew again “briefed” the board on his opposition to critical race theory and the “Crucial Communist Teaching Act” at a board meeting. Perdew subsequently filed a lawsuit against the district, alleging that the school board failed to communicate its official public position on critical race theory, which he alleged violated his First Amendment Rights, as well as the 14th Amendment.
The district moved to dismiss the claims on the basis that Perdew failed to allege facts from which any plausible constitutional violation might be inferred. The court agreed, finding that “while the First Amendment guarantees the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, it does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act upon or adopt a citizen’s views.”
The court found that Perdew freely exercised his First Amendment right to petition the board and to speak publicly at its meetings on at least three occasions. Because Perdew did not allege that his speech was curtailed but only that he did not receive the response he requested, the court found that he failed to state any plausible claim and granted the district’s motion to dismiss the claims.
Sixth Circuit upholds district court actions on parent’s pro se Sec. 504 claim because law does not permit pro se representation of others and IDEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Parker v. W. Carroll Special School Dist., 6th Cir. No. 21-5700, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6572 (Mar. 14, 2022).
In 2021, Ryanne Parker, the mother of N.P., an autistic child who received special education services in the West Carroll Special School District, filed a pro se complaint in the Carroll County Chancery Court alleging that the district denied her daughter a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Sec. 504). Parker was seeking monetary damages.
The school district removed the action to district court and filed a motion to dismiss. Parker asked the district court to remand the case to chancery court and to add her daughter to the complaint as a plaintiff. Parker was briefly represented by counsel who later withdrew from the case. After her counsel withdrew, Parker filed an amended pro se complaint against the district. The district filed a motion to dismiss the ADA and Sec. 504 claims because Parker failed to state a personal claim and that she could not represent N.P. The court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations that it grant the district’s motion on these bases. The court also granted the district’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that Parker failed to exhaust administrative remedies because she withdrew her request to the Tennessee Department of Education (DOE) for a due process hearing.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s holdings. It stated that ADA and Sec. 504 apply to claims by individuals with disabilities that they were excluded from, or denied the benefits of, government programs by reason of their disability or, if the plaintiff is not a person with a disability, that they suffered injuries because of their association with a disabled person. The court concluded that Parker alleged that the district discriminated against N.P. but did not allege that she was personally excluded from or denied benefits by the district, nor was she otherwise discriminated against by the district because of her association with N.P. Parker also failed to allege in her complaint any facts supporting a claim that the district retaliated against her for opposing unlawful practices.
Regarding Parker’s IDEA claim, the circuit court concluded that the district court properly granted the district court’s motion for summary judgment because Parker failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court based its conclusion on the fact that, although Parker submitted a request to the DOE for a due process hearing in October 2019, she later withdrew that request.
Appeals court invalidates land use plan created by subcommittee of township board of trustees because subcommittee did not follow requirements of Open Meetings Act.
State ex rel. Mohr v. Colerain Twp., 2022-Ohio-1109 (Apr. 1, 2022).
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/1/2022/2022-Ohio-1109.pdf
The Colerain Township Board of Trustees created by unanimous consent a subcommittee called the Comprehensive Land Use Plan Subcommittee to identify appropriate land use policies and create an appropriate updated land use plan for the township. The subcommittee met privately, did not take minutes of its meetings and did not provide notice of its meetings to the public. The proceedings were informal and no votes were taken, but the subcommittee did come up with recommendations that were eventually submitted to the board of trustees. The record also shows that the subcommittee members discussed issues by email.
Relators filed a complaint claiming that the subcommittee was a “public body” under the Open Meetings Act (OMA) and sought injunctive relief to prohibit the trustees from acting on the subcommittee recommendations. The trial court agreed and invalidated the plan based on the violations.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision. The court dispensed with the argument that the subcommittee was not a “public body” because it provided recommendations only to administrative staff and was not a decision-making body. The court noted that the act of creating recommendations itself requires decision-making, triggering the law’s requirement that the process be open to the public. The lack of formal “decision-making power” was not dispositive. The fact that the subcommittee did not take formal votes did not alter the fact that it was making decisions about recommendations that triggered the OMA.
The court also rejected arguments related to the lack of a quorum at the subcommittee meetings and found that the subcommittee’s use of email to make decisions violated the OMA. Lastly, the fact that the subcommittee did not “intentionally” circumvent the OMA’s requirements did not cure the violations.
Tenth district court of appeals reverses the county board of tax appeals (BTA) decision on the valuation of land and improvements because the BTA did not conduct the required evaluation of the property.
Columbus City School Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2022-Ohio-355 (Feb. 8, 2022).
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2022/2022-Ohio-355.pdf
The Columbus City School Board of Education appealed the decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) on the taxable value of two properties in the Columbus City School District within Franklin County.
The Franklin County Auditor appraised the two properties for tax year 2017. The auditor valued the Aston Place Acquisition LLC property, an apartment building located at 111 W. Third Ave., at a total value of $8.45 million, assigning $775,400 for the value of the land and $7.67 million for the vertical improvements (Aston property). The auditor valued the Abigail Acquisition LLC property, an apartment building located at 369 S. Gay St., at $6.825 million, assigning $651,900 for the land and $7,674,600 for the vertical improvements. Each property has a 15-year 100% tax abatement on the value of vertical improvements to the property, Aston through 2028 and Abigail through 2026.
The board challenged the auditor’s valuation of the taxable value of both properties before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR), requesting an increase for the Aston property of $971,240 and for the Abigail property of $1,942,490. To support the complaint, the board submitted appraisals of the properties prepared by Thomas Sprout and Brian Barnes.
In March 2019, the BOR issued two written decisions on the two properties. The BOR made no change to the auditor’s valuation of the Aston property and increased the value of the Abigail property by $369,100. Both the board and the owners of the Abigail property appealed the BOR’s decisions to the BTA. In response to a motion from the Abigail’s owners, the BTA consolidated the cases involving both properties.
In February 2021, the BTA adopted Sprout’s valuation for the total value of the Abigail property, placing its value at $8.165 million. However, the BTA assigned only $773,700 for the land and the rest of the increased value for the improvements. The BTA also adopted Sprout’s valuation for the total value of the Aston property, placing its value at $11.8 million. Again, the BTA assigned a lower amount of the increase for the land ($1,066,750) and the improvements value for $10,558,250.
The board’s motion for reconsideration of the BTA's decision was denied, and the board appealed the BTA decision on March 1, 2021. The board filed a complaint with the Tenth District Court of Appeals appealing the decision.
The court first considered the question of whether the BTA erred in adopting the auditor’s original land values. Ohio Administrative Code (OAC) 5703-25-07(B) provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be the duty of the county auditor to so value and appraise the land and improvements to land that when the two separate values for land and improvements are added together, the resulting value indicates the true value in money of the entire property." The court described the four principal methods for land valuation described in OAC 5703-25-11.
Ohio Revised Code (RC) 5715.19 authorizes a board of education to file a complaint challenging the "total valuation or assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list." RC 5717.03(B) provides that, in the event of an appeal from the decision of a county BOR, the BTA “shall determine the taxable value of the [subject] property.” The court cited case law concluding that a BTA should not make a presumption that the BOR’s value is valid and must instead “perform its own independent weighing of the evidence in the record” (Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2017-Ohio-5823).
The court stated that the BTA’s rejection of the auditor's determination of total value and concomitant reliance on the auditor's proportions of value for the land and improvements, despite the presence of clear evidence presented by the board negating those values, was puzzling. Sprout's appraisal reports, considered in conjunction with his testimony, furnished evidence that negated the validity of the auditor's valuation and furnished an independent basis for valuing the property. It concluded that the BTA’s decision was unreasonable and unlawful as to the determination of the valuation of the land and improvement of the two properties based on the clear evidence negating the auditor's valuation, the absence of other evidence in support of the auditor's valuation, the BTA's contradictory statements regarding its rationale for rejecting Sprout's determination of the value of the properties' land and improvements, the absence of other supporting reasons in its decisions, and considering the BTA's adoption of the total values reached by Sprout after having found his appraisal reports to be competent, credible and probative evidence. The court reversed and remanded the combined cases to the BTA to conduct an independent determination of the valuation of the properties based on all evidence contained in the record. It stated: “Because the board's evidence, in the form of Sprout's appraisals, contradicts the auditor's determination in whole or in part and no evidence was presented to support the auditor's valuation, the BTA was under a ‘legal duty’ to conduct ‘an independent valuation of the property.’ [Citations omitted.] By adopting the auditor's original allocation of value without conducting its own independent valuation, the BTA violated that legal duty.”
District court dismisses claims by parent of 8-year-old with a disability stemming from an incident with teacher on special education transportation grounds despite conviction of teacher on child abuse charges.
Duchin v. E. Upper Peninsula Intermediate School Dist., W.D.Mich. No. 2:21-cv-161 2022, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60161 (Mar. 21, 2022)
Parents of 8-year-old child with a disability brought suit against the defendant school district and an individual teacher after an incident on a special education transportation bus. The student had a significant neurological condition and had the cognitive function of a 16-18 month old. She also had a hearing impairment. Because of her disability, she was served with an individualized education program (IEP). Among the services in the IEP, she was provided with specialized transportation, riding the special education bus to and from school with adult support and lap restraints.
In July 2019, while the student was riding the specialized bus, a teacher allegedly dragged the child by her arms, pushed her up against a metal pole and verbally assaulted her. While the student was not seriously physically injured by the teacher’s actions other than some bruising, the parents indicated that the student was psychologically injured by the actions, impairing her ability to receive her education and trust adult women. They reported that the child also experienced educational regression in potty training, loss of sleep and had “meltdowns” as a result of the incident. The teacher was convicted of fourth-degree child abuse for the conduct in question.
The parents brought multiple claims against the district, including constitutional claims under the Fourth and 14th Amendments via 42 United States Code 1983 (Sec. 1983), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and a failure to train and supervise, as well as four state law tort claims.
The district court dismissed all federal claims against the school district for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The parents had claimed that the incidents impaired the child’s ability to access her education as the basis of their ADA and Section 504. The court analyzed these claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) exhaustion requirement and related precedent and determined that the parents were required to exhaust the claims under the IDEA administrative process because the gravamen of the claims was a free appropriate public education (FAPE) denial allegation.
The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims, analyzing the conduct under the substantive due process shocks-the-conscience standard. Conduct is found to shock the conscience if it is “brutal” and “inhumane.” The court found that because the student was not significantly physically injured by the actions of the teacher and because verbal injuries can generally never form the basis of constitutional violations, the teacher’s conduct did not rise the level of shocking the conscience. The court lastly dismissed the failure to train and supervise claim against the district, finding that the district was not deliberately indifferent regarding the teacher’s actions, as there was only one incident of alleged problem activity which does not constitute a pattern.
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims.
Sixth Circuit allows Section 1983 suit against district to move forward after teenage student was pinned to the ground by the knee of vice principal and had jaw broken by school resource officer.
E.W. v. Detroit Pub. School Dist., 6th Cir. No. 20-1790, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7724 (Mar. 21, 2022)
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0126n-06.pdf
The court upheld the denial of summary judgment against the Detroit Public School District on a Section 1983 claim against district employees on the basis of excessive force. The action stemmed from an incident in which the student, E.W., was involved in physical altercations with a vice principal and a school police officer. E.W. was attempting to enter the school building after school hours to retrieve his wallet, which he had mistakenly left with a teacher during the school day. The vice principal intervened to stop the student from entering the building, which he later claimed was because entering through that door was against school policy, as students were required to use the front entrance, which had metal detectors. The student then tried to enter through the rear entrance, which the vice principal also tried to stop.
The student became angry, and the encounter became physical as the vice principal confronted E.W. The vice principal removed the student from the school building and forced E.W. onto the pavement as the altercation escalated. He then pinned E.W. on the ground with his knee to his back. The vice principal removed himself, stating a need to “separate” himself from the situation. This scene was observed by the school resource officer and a private security guard.
After the vice principal left the incident, the student was approached by the school resource officer. E.W. was still escalated, and the resource officer used his arm to keep the student from reentering the building. The force of this impact dislocated E.W.’s jaw. He was then taken to the emergency room by his guardian because of those injuries. The student also claimed that he had issues raising his arms and had psychological injuries stemming from the incident.
E.W.’s guardian filed suit under 42 United States Code 1983 (Sec. 1983) against the vice principal and the police officer individually as well as against the school district. The court determined that summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity was improper. Public officials are not entitled to immunity if they: (1) violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) the rights are “clearly established.” The court first noted that, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to E.W., the force used by the resource officer was likely excessive, as the officer did not observe E.W. commit any crimes, E.W. was not perceived as a threat and there was no clear evidence that E.W. was resisting arrest. Thus, using enough force that broke E.W.’s jaw was “gratuitous violence” and violated a clearly established right.
With regard to the vice principal, the court noted that a reasonable jury could conclude that he violated E.W.’s constitutional rights. The court noted the four factors used to determine whether a violation has occurred: (1) Was there a pedagogical justification for the use of force? (2) Was the force utilized excessive to meet the legitimate objective in this situation? (3) Was the force applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm? and (4) Was there a serious injury? Because genuine issues of fact could be raised for each factor, the court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate. For instance, a jury could determine that there was little pedagogical justification for using force in a situation that was after school hours and that there was no justifying slamming the student to the ground and pinning him with his knee. The court also highlighted the ongoing injury to E.W.’s arms.
Ohio district court dismisses claims against school district after recreation league using district property bans elementary school volleyball player and her father from participation.
Doe v. BMG Sports, LLC, S.D.Ohio No. 1:20-cv-688, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20255 (Feb. 4, 2022).
https://casetext.com/case/doe-v-bmg-sports-llc
The Mariemont City School District entered into an agreement with the Mariemont Recreation Association (MRA), a private, nonprofit organization that organizes youth sports for students enrolled in Mariemont’s two elementary schools, to make one of its building facilities available for MRA’s sports programs. One activity that MRA offers is a youth volleyball team. In operating this team, MRA has contracted with the Cincinnati Premier Youth Volleyball League (CPYVL), which matches the MRA’s teams with opponents, schedules the dates and times of games and sends referees to officiate those games.
On Sept. 13, 2018, W.W., a fourth-grade student at Mariemont Elementary School, was playing a game against another CPYVL team at Mariemont Junior High School. CPYVL supplied the referee for the game. Both before and after the game, the referee made a series of offensive and sexualizing remarks about the female elementary school players. Disturbed by the referee’s conduct, W.W.’s father contacted the coaches following game. The coaches informed him that a complaint had already been filed. A few days later, one of the coaches informed W.W.’s father that the referee had been removed from the entire reffing board.
W.W.’s father remained concerned and reached out to MRA to obtain the referee’s name and to urge the organization to contact the parents of a player who had been specifically targeted by the referee’s conduct. After he was unable to obtain the name of the referee through the MRA, W.W.’s father filed a police report, contacted the head of CPYVL, the principal of W.W.’s elementary school and the principal of the junior high school where the incident took place.
The following year, W.W.’s father registered W.W. for the MRA/CPYVL’s upcoming fall volleyball season. Soon thereafter, MRA emailed W.W.’s father to inform him that he was banned from attending any CPYVL events. W.W.’s father was not provided with a reason for the ban.
W.W.’s father then scheduled a meeting with Mariemont’s superintendent. During this meeting, the superintendent told W.W.’s father that he had concluded this was "not a matter worthy of [his] time" because no other parents had complained. The superintendent declined to investigate the ban and "expressed concern over the impact any investigation into the MRA's affiliation with [the] leagues might have on current youth sports in the School District." When W.W.’s father discussed the possibility of going to the school board, the superintendent told him the board "would not care." Nonetheless, W.W.’s father met with the board’s president and vice president. Both indicated that the issue “was not a district matter,” denied knowing the reason for the ban and refused W.W.’s father’s request for a hearing.
The next day, W.W.’s father emailed the head of CPYVL, writing that in the absence of any explanation as to what rules had been broken, the only reasonable conclusion was that the ban was in retaliation for the October 2018 police report. In response, the head of CPYVL permanently suspended W.W. from all sports programs.
In September 2020, W.W.’s father filed a complaint on behalf of himself and W.W., asserting various claims against CPYVL and its employees, the district and its employees, and the MRA and its employees. On Nov. 19, 2020, the district moved to dismiss all claims against them, including claims alleging a breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Ohio State Constitution, violation of Title IX and 42 United States Code (USC) 1983.
The court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims against the district. With regard to the allegation that the district was liable for breaching its contract with MRA to provide coaching, instruction, practice and game opportunities for his daughter to play volleyball, the court found that W.W.’s father did not properly put the district on notice of what terms of the contract it allegedly violated. The court also dismissed the claim due to the lack of any specific factual allegations that the district was a party to any contract.
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the district’s employees. The plaintiffs alleged that because the district’s employees “ratified” the ban and W.W. suffered emotional distress as a result of that ban, a viable claim existed. The court dismissed the claim after finding that W.W.’s father failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to show that W.W. suffered “serious emotional anguish” as a result of the ban.
The plaintiffs’ constitutional and Title IX claims against the district also were dismissed. The court found that W.W.’s father did not make an effort to explain the obligations he believed the state constitution or Title IX imposed, or how he believed the district violated those provisions.
The plaintiffs’ final claim alleged that the district was liable under 42 USC 1983 because it ratified the ban on W.W.’s participation in the volleyball league and W.W.’s father’s presence at league events, which in turn violated their constitutional rights to substantive due process, procedural due process and freedom of speech. The court concluded that such allegations fell short of establishing a plausible Sec. 1983 claim. The court rejected the conclusory allegation that the district “ratified” the ban, as the record reflected that the districts’ employees were made aware of the ban and declined to intervene. The court recognized that the employees’ actions demonstrated “passive acquiescence” and not the affirmative approval that is required to adequately allege that they ratified the ban. Because the claim did not allege that the district had any role in instituting the ban, nor did it allege that they took any steps to help enforce it, the court rejected the claim as a matter of law. The court also rejected arguments that MRA and its employees were “state actors” for purposes of Sec. 1983.
Appeals court upholds trial court’s dismissal, for lack of standing, of claims by former students challenging the constitutionality of a district’s drug-testing policy.
Langin v. Sheffield-Sheffield Lake Bd. of Edn., 2022-Ohio-879 (Mar. 21, 2022).
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/9/2022/2022-Ohio-879.pdf
Zackory and Joshua Langin, former students in the Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School District, and their parents brought a complaint against the board of education in 2020 challenging the constitutionality of a student drug testing policy enacted by the board in 2015. The parents had previously filed challenges to the policy on behalf of their sons, but those challenges were dismissed without prejudice. When it dismissed the claims, the trial court noted that Joshua Langin was a senior at the high school he attended and currently subject to the policy. At the time the new complaint was filed, both Zackory and Joshua Langin had graduated from high school and neither was subject to the policy.
The board of education filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on mootness, lack of justiciable controversy, qualified immunity and no private cause of action for damages. The board noted that the Langin brothers filed the complaint after they were no longer district students, depriving them of standing. The board argued that “[a]lthough some exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist, no exception can save a dispute which became moot before litigation commenced.” The trial court granted the board’s motion to dismiss.
Zackory Langin appealed the trial court’s decision. The appeals court upheld the trial court’s decision. Specifically, the appeals court stated that Langin was no longer subject to the policy and can no longer suffer from its alleged adverse effects. Furthermore, a favorable outcome in the claim would not redress his alleged injuries. As a result, the court agreed that Langin no longer had a sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of this controversy and lacks standing.
Langin also argued that the trial court’s dismissal of the earlier claim, filed by his parents on his behalf when he was a minor and a student, was improper and resulted in a violation of his due process rights. The court overruled this claim because Langin did not file a timely appeal from the judgment entry dismissing the earlier case.
Ohio court of appeals affirms district’s termination of custodian’s employment after he confronted two teachers for putting tape on the floor of their classrooms.
Hobbs v. Pickaway-Ross Career & Tech. Ctr. Bd. of Edn., 2022-Ohio-921 (Mar. 21, 2022).
https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/fourth-district-court-of-appeals/2022/21ca3746.html
Jon Hobbs was employed as a custodian for the Pickaway-Ross Career & Technology Center (CTC). On Aug. 22, 2018, Hobbs sought out and confronted two of the CTC’s teachers for putting tape on the floor of their classrooms. He was angry because the tape got caught in his sweeper. The two teachers coauthored a written statement complaining of Hobbs’ conduct on that date, claiming that he cursed because of the tape but “stopped short of calling the teacher the third letter in the alphabet,” which one of the teachers interpreted to mean an offensive word. Hobbs authored his own written statement that provided his version of what occurred, claiming he apologized for sweeping up the tape and did not say anything inappropriate or sexual in nature. The CTC superintendent met with all three individuals to discuss the incident and ultimately recommended that the board terminate Hobbs’ employment. The board issued a resolution terminating Hobbs’ employment for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, neglect of duty, misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance.
Hobbs appealed the board’s decision to the court of common pleas alleging the following three assignments of error: 1) the district terminated his employment without any fact finding, which made a meaningful review of the district’s decision impossible; 2) Hobbs’ due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of the charges against him; there was no transcript of the administrative proceedings, he was not afforded an opportunity to present evidence, or witnesses; and he was not permitted to attend the meeting where the board voted to terminate his employment; and 3) the district erroneously labeled Hobbs as a “substitute.”
The lower court found that there was a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence that Hobbs acted with malfeasance and was dishonest. The court found that the manner in which Hobbs approached the teacher and the context of what he said to her left her shaken and with the impression — whether accurate or not — that Hobbs had directed a crude remark to her. In addressing appellee's dishonesty determination, the trial court noted that the written statements by Hobbs and the teachers recounted the incident differently. It further found that the district’s superintendent had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of Hobbs and the teachers while meeting with them regarding the incident, and that the superintendent concluded that Hobbs’ account was not truthful in stating what happened during his encounter with the teachers. On that basis, the lower court affirmed the district’s termination of Hobbs’ employment. Hobbs appealed.
On appeal, Hobbs argued that the trial court’s decision affirming his termination was not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. The court of appeals ruled that the district had the authority to assess the credibility of the statements of Hobbs and the teachers and determine which were reliable or credible. Accepting that the district found the teachers’ statements more credible, even without speculating what Hobbs meant by not “calling the teacher the third letter of the alphabet,” the court found that there was evidence that Hobbs acted in a hostile, confrontational manner when speaking to the teacher, and that this could support a claim of malfeasance by Hobbs. As a result, the court of appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the district’s decision was supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence supporting the district’s decision.
The court also rejected Hobbs’ argument that the district “grossly neglected” its duty in deciding to terminate Hobbs’ employment. In support of his claim, Hobbs cited the fact that the board needed only 10 minutes to decide that he should be terminated. In response, the district claimed that it conducted an investigation and provided Hobbs with an opportunity to respond to the allegation before convening and deciding to terminate him, which is sufficient pretermination due process. The court found that the mere fact that the board’s deliberation was brief was insufficient to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in affirming the district’s decision to terminate Hobbs.
For these reasons, the court ordered that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Federal court declines to intervene in state disciplinary proceedings against special education teacher after the teacher was terminated by district and the state department sought surrender of his teaching license.
Watkins v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-04482, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39298 (Mar. 7, 2022)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3512761017701034860&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
Plaintiff Watkins was a special education teacher in Columbus City Schools (CCS). After Watkins was observed falling asleep in class and having other issues, CCS terminated his employment, and the Ohio Department of Education (ODE) initiated an investigation to determine whether to remove his special education instructional license. Watkins twice requested a copy of the underlying complaint, but ODE refused on the basis of confidentiality. ODE issued a letter to Watkins in 2019 with the results of the investigation and requested the voluntary surrender of his license and agreement to a bar from his ever applying again.
Watkins then filed a lawsuit under 42 United States Code 1983 based on his termination. He also attempted to remove the state administrative proceeding to federal court, which the federal court declined. Watkins challenged the constitutionality of the ODE state administrative proceeding, citing an alleged failure to properly notify him of his pre-disciplinary hearing. He sought a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction to allow him to retain his license while the court resolved the claim on the administrative proceeding. ODE requested the court to abstain from interfering in the administrative proceeding under the doctrine of Younger abstention, which was established in the Supreme Court case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Under Younger, a federal court will not “enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings if doing so would interfere with an ongoing state criminal prosecution or detract from ‘proper respect for state functions.’" The doctrine has been extended to certain other noncriminal proceedings. One category of cases to which it has been extended are cases that are akin to criminal proceedings, such as disciplinary hearings for licensed professionals such as attorneys or educators. To determine whether to apply abstention, a court will employ a three-part test: If (1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) the proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims, the federal court should generally apply abstention and refrain from becoming involved.
The court decided to apply abstention. First, it determined that the proceedings were ongoing because the State Board of Education had yet to render a decision. The court next recognized that determining who may teach in Ohio’s schools is an important state interest. As to the third prong, the court noted that because Watkins would have the opportunity to appeal the Board’s decision to the court of common pleas, there would be an opportunity for him to raise any constitutional objections to the process in the state forum.
The district court further determined that none of the exceptions to Younger applied because Watkins failed to show the state board acted in bad faith, or that he was challenging a patently unconstitutional statute or that there was pressing need for federal equitable intervention. Because the court found abstention was warranted, it stayed Watkins’ request for equitable relief.
Ohio district court finds Ohio University deliberately indifferent after university takes “virtually no action” to address harassment in classroom setting.
Doe v. Ohio Univ., S.D.Ohio No. 2:21-cv-858, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54992 (Mar. 28, 2022).
https://casetext.com/case/doe-v-ohio-univ
On Feb. 23, 2019, Jane Doe attended a house party at Ohio University. Doe became intoxicated to the point where she vomited multiple times, was unable to talk or walk without assistance and lost consciousness in various places in the house. According to Doe, she woke up in an armchair to another student kissing her. She was unable to stop his advances and fell in and out of consciousness. Doe then woke up in the student’s bed where he was having sexual intercourse with her. She was still unable to leave or speak. When she finally told the student that she wanted to go home, he ignored her and continued having intercourse with her.
Doe received a rape examination at a hospital the next day. A few days later, she reported the incident to the university’s Title IX office and submitted a Sexual Misconduct, Relationship Violence and Stalking Incident Report to the university. Doe also lodged a formal complaint with the local police department.
Following her report, the university contacted Doe and scheduled an interview with her. The university also interviewed witnesses and the alleged perpetrator. During the investigation, Doe was repeatedly harassed, bullied and subjected to degrading comments and accusations of being a liar, a “fake rape victim” and a racist as a result of her Title IX complaint. Doe alleged that she was physically poked and prodded by students who insulted her because of her status as a survivor of sexual assault. Doe alleged that the harassment was so open and notorious that several of her classmates inquired about it and complained on her behalf to a professor.
The university did not dispute that they knew about and received reports of the harassment but contended that, because Doe did not give them the names of her harassers, it did not have actual knowledge of the harassment. The court found that Title IX does not require the university to know every detail of the harassment, simply that such harassment is occurring.
The court found that there were sufficient allegations of the university’s deliberate indifference. Doe alleged that even after the school knew she faced harassment in class, neither the university nor the professor acted to stop it. Doe alleged that she was placed in classroom groups with the alleged perpetrator’s friends, subjected to poking and prodding, name-calling and other abuses. She alleged that the university did not act even after other students asked the professor to step in. Instead, the professor suggested that the other students were immature and that Doe would learn how to deal with them. Later, when the alleged perpetrator violated a protective order to stay away from Doe and the prosecutor asked the university to step in, Doe alleged that the university did nothing. The court found this conduct to be indicative of a pattern of refusing to take action to bring the harassers into compliance. While the university was not required to remedy the harassment, the court found that it was deliberately indifferent for the university to take virtually no action to address harassment where it “exercises substantial control” over the harassers and the context, such as in a classroom setting.
For these reasons, the court rejected the university’s motion to dismiss Doe’s claims for deliberate indifference under Title IX and allowed Doe the opportunity to conduct discovery and support her claims.
Sixth Circuit finds that the stricter standard for peer-harassment deliberate-indifference claims should not apply in the context of teacher-student harassment claims.
Wamer v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th Cir. No. 20-4219, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 5511 (Mar. 2, 2022).
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/20-4219/20-4219-2022-03-02.html
On May 2, 2018, Jaycee Wamer, an undergraduate student at the University of Toledo (UT), was working to complete a final project for Instructor Eric Tyger’s class at UT’s media center when Tyger came from behind and placed his arm around her, resting it on her chest while touching her hair. Wamer continued working on her project, and when it was complete, she asked Tyger for permission to use the computer in his office to print her project for submission. Tyger indicated that she could do so but did not move from his seat, so Wamer was forced to reach across Tyger’s lap to access Tyger’s computer to print the assignment. As she did so, Tyger leaned his head against Wamer, placed his hand on the middle of her thigh and told her she smelled good, asking what kind of perfume she wore because he wanted to “buy it for his wife.” Tyger also asked Wamer about her job at a state park, mentioning he had once worked there and would go into the empty rooms to have sex with women.
On May 4, Wamer contacted a faculty member at UT and reported Tyger’s unwanted sexual advances. That day, both Wamer and the faculty member submitted a complaint regarding Tyger’s conduct to UT’s Office of Title IX and Compliance. At some point following submission of the reports, UT’s Title IX Office contacted Wamer and asked whether she was comfortable attending a face-to-face interview on campus regarding the incident. Wamer responded that she was not. According to Wamer, UT informed her it would continue to pursue the case against Tyger even if she did not come in for an in-person interview. However, three weeks after Wamer submitted her report, UT notified Wamer that it was closing its investigation and would be taking no action.
After UT closed its investigation without taking any action against Tyger, Wamer had an increasingly difficult time concentrating on her studies and feared visiting campus for in-person classes. As a result, Wamer changed her major, avoided coming to campus and began enrolling in online classes to ensure she would not come into contact with Tyger.
In October 2018, the faculty member at UT arranged a meeting between Wamer and a more senior faculty member to discuss Tyger’s alleged harassment of Wamer. After the meeting, the more senior faculty member filed a third complaint to UT’s Title IX Office regarding Tyger’s May conduct. On Nov. 27, 2018, UT placed Tyger on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from coming to campus. Wamer alleged that, after he was placed on administrative leave, Tyger attempted to smear her reputation by outing her as the student who reported him, publicizing her grades and accusing her of lying. In May 2019, UT held a pre-disciplinary hearing for Tyger. UT investigators found that Tyger had engaged in sexual misconduct and recommended termination.
Wamer filed a claim against UT under Title IX, claiming that the University was deliberately indifferent to the reports of sexual harassment that she made in May 2018 and that the university’s indifference “unreasonably interfered with Wamer’s participation in and enjoyment of the benefits of UT’s educational programs and activities.” UT filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Title IX. UT argued that Wamer failed to plead facts sufficient to find that she was subjected to “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment” or that she was “subjected to further sexual harassment after notifying the University of her complaint.”
The district court granted UT’s motion to dismiss. The court found that although Tyger subjected Wamer to unwelcome and indefensible sexual harassment, Wamer did not allege that UT’s action post-notice was detrimental in that it resulted in harassment or that UT’s insufficient action made 'the victim more vulnerable to, meaning unprotected from, further harassment.'" According to the district court, Wamer’s subjective dissatisfaction with the investigation's outcome did not plausibly support an inference that UT's response, to engage in a three-week investigation unaided by Wamer, left her exposed to a risk of further sexual harassment or caused her to be more vulnerable to such sexual harassment.
On appeal, the court reviewed whether the standard in Kollaritsch v. Michigan State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 944 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.2019), which introduced a causation element requiring additional post-notice harassment in deliberate-indifference claims alleging student-on-student harassment, also applied in cases alleging teacher-on-student harassment. The district court had assumed that Kollaritsch applied and dismissed the case at least in part because Wamer’s complaint did not allege any additional instances of harassment occurring after her complaint to UT’s Title IX office.
The court of appeals court held that the more stringent standard for peer-harassment deliberate-indifference claims introduced in Kollaritsch should not apply in the context of teacher-student harassment claims. The court held that the higher standards for establishing the requisite culpability in peer-harassment situations were unnecessary in the context of teacher-student harassment. While a school “obviously subjects" its students to harassment and discrimination when it fails to respond to harassment by its agent (a teacher or professor), the court of appeals opined that a school can only be seen to be responsible for the impacts of student-on-student harassment in more limited circumstances.
The court of appeals also pointed to important policy reasons for imposing a less stringent standard in cases alleging teacher-student harassment. Title IX "protects students from discrimination" and "shields them from being 'excluded from participation in' or 'denied the benefits of' a recipient's 'education program or activity' on the basis of gender." The court found that the relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or activity. When a teacher sexually harasses a student, the court indicated it can more easily be presumed that the harassment would undermine and detract from the student's educational experience because teachers are at the core of a student’s access to and experience of education. When a student has been sexually harassed by a teacher or professor, that student's ability to benefit from the educational experience provided by the school is often undermined unless the school steps in to remedy the situation because the student is put in the position of choosing to forego an educational opportunity in order to avoid contact with the harasser, or to continue attempting to receive the educational experience tainted with the fear of further harassment or abuse. For that reason, the court found that requiring an additional post-notice incident of harassment in teacher-student deliberate-indifference cases would undermine the purpose of Title IX.
The court of appeals found that because Wamer alleged facts that allowed the inference that her fear of further harassment was objectively reasonable, and that her post-harassment actions resulting in the deprivation of educational opportunities were reasonably taken to avoid further harassment, she had sufficiently stated a claim for deliberate indifferent to teacher-student harassment. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal of Wamer’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings.