School Law Summary 2021-1
In this issue: Board Of Education – Authority • Equal Protection • First Amendment – Picketing • First Amendment – Religion • Immunity • Individuals With Disabilities • Parental Rights • Property Valuation • Public Records • Substitute Teachers • Termination
BOARD OF EDUCATION – AUTHORITY
Trial court dismisses motion seeking to compel district to provide in-person learning and concludes that public interest is not served by mandating in-person instruction during a pandemic.
Doe v. Upper Arlington Bd.of Edn., Franklin C.P. No. 20CV5150 (Jan. 6, 2021).
As a result of the global COVID-19 pandemic, school district boards of education in the state of Ohio were compelled to examine the ways in which they would offer instruction to students. The Upper Arlington City School District Board of Education decided, at a meeting on July 28, 2020, to offer all students an online instructional method to begin the 2020-21 school year. The board based its decision on information provided by the commissioner of health and assistant commissioner of health for Franklin County.
The board of education was sued by parents of students in the district, who argued that the board’s decision arbitrarily and unreasonably prevented students and families from enjoying their right under the Ohio Constitution to a thorough and efficient system of common schools. The plaintiffs characterized online instruction as deficient, incomplete, less than satisfactory and not equating to a thorough and efficient system of common schools. They stated that there is no reliable scientific evidence that establishes a causal relationship between the spread of COVID-19 and options for in-person instruction. Further, they argued that the rights secured by the Ohio Constitution do not disappear during a public health crisis.
The plaintiffs asked the court to issue the injunction barring the district from continuing with its plan to offer learning in a remote format and compelling it to offer in-person instruction. While there were originally multiple plaintiffs in the case, there was only one John Doe plaintiff remaining at the time of the court's action.
The district asked the OSBA Legal Assistance Fund (LAF) to write an amicus curiae memorandum in support of its position. LAF prepared and filed the memorandum along with its partners, the Buckeye Association of School Administrators and Ohio Association of School Business Officials. LAF involvement was warranted because school boards across the state could have faced similar challenges and boards of education have an interest in having the scope of their authority in making these decisions confirmed.
The court concluded that the constitutional provision for a thorough and efficient system of common schools does not create a fundamental right to a basic minimum education or require a particular mode of instruction. Applying the test for granting a preliminary injunction, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not have a substantial likelihood for success on the merits of their claims; that they failed to provide evidence of any concrete injury that would be suffered from distance only learning; and that the public interest will not be served by mandating in-person learning in the midst of a global pandemic.
The plaintiffs have filed an appeal with the 10th District Court of Appeals. LAF will be supporting the district with an amicus brief at the appeals level.
Michigan court rejects citizen’s Equal Protection claim after he received only two minutes to speak at school board meeting.
Davis v. Detroit Pub. Schools Community Dist., 6th Cir. No. 18-2304, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35207 (Nov. 6, 2020).
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3131723970512810702&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
In 2012, voters in Detroit, Michigan, approved an 18-mills Detroit Public Schools Community District’s operating millage. This increase in taxes sought to provide funds for the school district’s operating expenses. The following year, the Detroit Downtown Development Authority (DDDA) and Detroit Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (DBRA), both tax increment financing (TIF) entities, chose to use a TIF plan to construct the Little Caesars Arena, which was to serve as the new home of the Detroit Red Wings and Detroit Pistons. A TIF plan allows a local government to finance public improvements in a designated area by capturing the property taxes from any increase in property values in the area.
Robert Davis, a community activist, was unhappy about this capture of tax revenue that he thought the Detroit public school district should receive in full. He believed that Michigan law required the electorate to vote before DDDA and DBRA could take the collected taxes.
In June 2017, Davis emailed the Detroit Public School Community District Board of Education. Davis wanted the board to place an issue on the November 2017 ballot asking voters to approve or disapprove the use of tax revenue for the completion of the Little Caesars Arena. At its June 23, 2017, meeting, the board’s legal counsel said that she did not think the board could place the issue on the ballot. David tried interrupting the board twice to argue why counsel was incorrect. He ultimately spoke for two minutes during the public comment portion instead. The meeting ended without the board deciding whether to put the issue on the ballot.
Days after the meeting, Davis and Etta Wilcoxon, a concerned Detroit citizen, sued the district. They brought seven claims, including an Equal Protection violation arising from the board meeting where Davis received only two minutes to speak. According to Davis, the board regularly waives the two-minute rule and allows more time to speak, especially when the board considers the speakers to be “experts.” The suit also included seven state law claims in which Davis and Wilcoxon sought declaratory judgments determining that the use of the funds was a ballot question and that the TIF entities were misusing the funds.
The district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts. The plaintiffs appealed, alleging that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim.
On appeal, Davis attached newspaper articles to suggest that the board allowed a different community activist to speak for longer than two minutes during a previous meeting on a different issue. He also offered testimony from a school board member who noted that it is “typical” for the person who called the meeting to get more than two minutes to speak at meetings.
The court rejected the board member’s testimony since it did not provide “concrete allegations” of individuals similarly situated to Davis. The court also rejected the newspaper articles since they constituted inadmissible hearsay. However, the court stated that even if they could consider the evidence, it would not help Davis. The newspaper articles described two hotly contested 2018 board meetings when the board removed a community activist for disrupting a meeting. The court found that Davis and the community activist were not similarly situated individuals because the other community activist was on the agenda for her meeting and Davis was not. As a result, the court rejected Davis’ Equal Protection claim because he had identified no similarly situated individuals.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ state law claims, finding that both plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue the claims.
Appeals court finds Ohio statute prohibiting the picketing of public officials’ residences and places of business to be unconstitutional.
Portage Cty. Educators Assn. for Dev. Disabilities - Unit B, OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 2020-Ohio-7004.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/PDF/11/2020/2020-Ohio-7004.pdf
The Portage County Educators Association for Developmental Disabilities — Unit B, Ohio Education Association/National Education Association and the Portage County Board of Developmental Disabilities were engaged in negotiations for a successor agreement. Following mediation, the parties declared impasse, and the association went on strike, during which members of the association picketed outside the private residences of six board members and outside the place of private employment of one board member. The actual picketing took place on public sidewalks and/or public streets. Association members who engaged in the picketing did so under the inducement and/or encouragement of the association. Association members were aware they were picketing the residences of the six board members and the place of private employment of one of the board members.
The board then filed seven unfair labor practice charges with the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) against the association, pursuant to and in accordance with Ohio Revised Code (RC) 4117.12(B) and Ohio Administrative Code Rule 4117-7-01. The board alleged the association had violated RC 4117.11(B)(7) and (B)(8). The RC 4117.11(B)(8) allegations were subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause. With regard to the remaining allegations, the parties agreed to stipulate the case directly to SERB and submitted joint stipulations of fact.
The association challenged the constitutionality of the statute at the hearing level. SERB declined to determine the constitutional validity of the statute in the administrative action due to its lack of jurisdiction over constitutional claims. SERB then determined the association committed an unfair labor practice.
RC 4117.11(B)(7) prohibits an "employee organization," such as the association, from inducing or encouraging any individual in connection with a labor relations dispute, such as association members, "to picket the residence or any place of private employment" of any "representative of the public employer” such as board members.
At issue on appeal is whether that statute is an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The lower court affirmed its constitutionality. To overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is: (1) necessary to serve a compelling state interest; and (2) narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means.
SERB and the board contended the governmental interests the statute seeks to serve are: (1) maintaining the residential privacy rights of public employer representatives; (2) encouraging private citizens to serve as public officials; and (3) preserving labor peace. The state is primarily concerned that, although government employees have been granted the right to unionize and strike, public service will be deterred if the state is not careful to protect the private lives of its public servants.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that protecting residential privacy is not a "compelling" governmental interest, recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has "expressly preserved the right of protesters to march through a residential neighborhood or go door-to-door within the residential neighborhood regardless of the residents' rights to privacy and well-being.” Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 76 Ohio St.3d 304, 309 (1996), citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Based on this precedent, the appeals court determined that SERB’s declarations about the government’s interest in preserving labor peace were too vague to qualify as compelling interests.
The court then found that even if SERB had established a compelling interest, RC 4117.11(B)(7) was not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means. The statute prohibits activity that did not specifically involve threats, coercion or restraint. If that was the compelling state interest, less restrictive alternatives were available, such as setting limits on time, place or number of picketers.
The court concluded by finding that RC 4117.11(B)(7) is content based, not necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means. It reversed the decision of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Appeals court finds that order limiting parent’s ability to remove children from school on Muslim holidays did not violate parent’s free exercise of religion.
Suwareh v. Nwankwo, 2020-Ohio-6899.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2020/2020-Ohio-6899.pdf
Lamin Suwareh and Chinelo Nwankwo were granted a divorce by the Butler County Court of Common Pleas in 2015. They entered into a shared parenting plan regarding their two minor children. Because Suwareh is a practicing Muslim and Nwankwo is a practicing Christian, the parenting plan included a discussion of parenting time preference for Muslim and Christian holidays.
Following the divorce, Nwankwo moved to Franklin County. The magistrate entered an order modifying the shared parenting schedule regarding transportation and telephone contact. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s order but modified the parenting schedule ordering that children should not miss school for parenting time on religious holidays. Suwareh appealed the trial court’s decision. The appeals court remanded to the trial court for an order addressing the parents’ ability to remove the children from school to exercise holiday parenting time.
In response, the magistrate suggested a holiday schedule and ordered that Suwareh could not remove the children from school if his holiday occurred on a school day but could have additional time to celebrate the holiday on the weekend after it occurred. While the trial court adopted a different holiday schedule, it agreed with the magistrate’s order regarding school days on the basis that none of the holidays Suwareh identified were designated as nonworking holidays and he did not present any evidence on whether Muslim schools close on those holidays. For that reason, the trial court determined that there was no reason to “preempt” the children’s regular school schedule in order for them to celebrate holidays with Suwareh.
Suwareh appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights to practice his religion because it promoted the children’s school attendance above his religious observances. Suwareh argued that this was a “blanket prohibition of religious observances in favor of regular school attendance.” The other grounds for Suwareh’s appeal did not involve school attendance and won’t be reviewed in this summary.
The appeals court concluded that the trial court’s decision did not violate Suwareh’s right to free exercise of religion. It did not prevent Suwareh from exercising his religious beliefs, limit him from attending any observance of Muslim holidays or burden his choice of religion. The trial court’s decision did not infringe on Suwareh’s free exercise of religion because he was free to instruct the children on his religious beliefs.
The appeals court acknowledged that Ohio Administrative Code 3301-69-02(B)(2)(f) permits absences from school for religious observance. Nonetheless, the court concluded that this was only one factor for the court to weigh when determining the best interest of the child. The court stated that the trial court did not specifically address its reasoning when balancing Suwareh’s right to communicate his religious beliefs and direct his children’s upbringing with the state’s interest in providing an education to the children. However, based on a review of the evidence presented, the court concluded that the trial court’s bar on removing the children from school did not impinge on Suwareh’s fundamental right to raise his children; was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable; and was not an abuse of discretion.
Appeals court agrees with district court that principal and assistant principal’s behavior was egregious and clearly reckless barring the use of governmental immunity.
Meyers v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., 983 F.3d 873, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40601, (6th Cir.2020)
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/18-3974/18-3974-2020-12-29.html
Gabriel Taye was a third-grade student at Carson Elementary School in Cincinnati, Ohio. Gabriel died by suicide on Jan. 26, 2017, after being bullied by other students at Carson Elementary on twelve occasions, dating back to his first-grade year.
The administrator of Gabriel’s estate, Karen Meyer, and of Gabriel’s parents, Cornelia Reynolds and Benyam Taye, filed suit against the Cincinnati Board of Education and several Carson Elementary officials under 42 United States Code 1983. The plaintiffs also alleged state law tort claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium and failure to report child abuse.
The district court dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss several state law claims, denying their claim of entitlement to governmental immunity, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code (RC) Chapter 2744. The governmental immunity provision provides, in relevant part, protection for public school officials from damages for injury or death caused by acts in connection with a governmental function, unless the officials were reckless or acted or failed to act with a conscious disregard or indifference to a known or obvious risk. On appeal, defendants continued to claim entitlement to governmental immunity, alleging that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they behaved recklessly.
Gabriel was attacked multiple times with progressing brutality. In the incident two days before his death, Gabriel was beaten by other students, and knocked unconscious for more than seven minutes. In that instance, Jeffrey McKenzie, the assistant principal, found Gabriel unconscious but failed to check his vital signs, call for help or review security footage of the incident. Later, the nurse failed to call 911, despite a school policy requiring the school to seek emergency medical attention when a student is unconscious for more than one minute. The nurse also misrepresented the incident that day by informing Gabriel’s parents that he had “fainted,” without investigating the cause of his injuries. Neither Ruthenia Jackson, the principal, nor McKenzie reported this incident, either internally or externally.
In addition to the incidents involving Gabriel, Carson Elementary School behavior logs documented routine aggressive and violent behavior among the student population throughout the 2016-17 school year. The plaintiffs also presented factual allegations suggesting that Jackson and McKenzie intentionally destroyed potential surveillance footage of the incidents in which Gabriel suffered injuries. Finally, the plaintiffs assert that Jackson and McKenzie's cover-up, aimed at keeping any information regarding the rampant violence and aggressive behavior at Carson Elementary School a secret, constitutes reckless, wanton disregard for Gabriel and his classmates' safety.
The court found the actions of Jackson and McKenzie to be egregious and clearly reckless, citing six instances when they failed to inform Gabriel’s parents of bullying incidents; failure to punish students responsible for the bullying; failure to contact 911 after Gabriel had been unconscious for over seven minutes’ and failure to put teachers on notice of the attack in the boys’ bathroom or take any steps to avoid future attacks, among other allegations.
As a result of the allegations, the court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, would bar the school employees from governmental immunity. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Jackson and McKenzie’s motion to dismiss the state law claims and its decision that they are not entitled to governmental immunity.
Court determines that although the teacher inappropriately used a body sock, it was not due to a physical defect and therefore is not an exception to immunity.
Shields v. Plummer, 2020-Ohio-5449
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2020/2020-Ohio-5449.pdf
N.C. was a fifth-grade student in Courtney Plummer's special education class at South Mifflin STEM Academy. Plummer testified that, on Feb. 20, 2013, in an attempt to calm N.C. and at the suggestion of a fellow special education teacher, she asked N.C. if he wanted to wear a body sock that the school owned. A body sock is a stretchable, bag-like lycra garment with a velcro opening that forms around the child's arms in loose sleeves, allowing the child full use of his or her arms while producing full-body sensory effect. N.C. accepted his teacher's invitation to step into the body sock and within seconds he fell and hit the floor with his face. The family has incurred more than $19,000 in medical expenses related to the fall and anticipated more medical issues to come.
The defendants' tort liability was subject to political subdivision immunity under Ohio Revised Code (RC) Chapter 2744. In determining whether a political subdivision is immune from tort liability, the court applied a three-tiered analysis. The sole assignment of error in this case involved the plaintiffs showing an exception to immunity. The plaintiffs’ case hinged on RC 2744.02(B)(4) that creates “an exception from immunity for injuries resulting from the negligence of political subdivision employees occurring within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function.”
N.C. and his mother pointed to no such physical defects, either at South Mifflin STEM Academy or even in the body sock itself. They argued that Plummer's judgment and lack of training was the issue that caused the injuries to N.C. They cited her choice to use the garment and the way in which she used it. The plaintiffs further stated, “Plummer improperly used the body sock because she was not trained or authorized to use it, and it was not prescribed for [N.C.]. Compounding its improper use, Plummer failed to have [N.C.] sit in the body sock to avoid injury."
The appeals court came to the same conclusion as the trial court. Because the plaintiffs did not show the existence of a physical defect, the court concluded that they did not meet the second required element. The court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
District court grants summary judgment to district and declines to give deference to state level review officer’s decision citing “bizarre and concerning legal errors.”
C.K. v. Bd. of Edn. of Sylvania City School Dist., N.D.Ohio No. 3:19 CV 2753, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24659 (Feb. 9, 2021).
C.K was diagnosed with autism before age 2. Notwithstanding intensive programming beginning at first diagnosis, C.K. suffered from significant reading deficits, including an inability to learn letters and their sounds, during preschool through first grade at a community school.
In 2015, C.K. started attending second grade in the Sylvania City School District. At that time, the school’s testing revealed that C.K.’s reading showed a nearly two grade-level deficit. The district provided C.K. with 100 minutes of reading services weekly. Starting in March 2016, C.K.’s mother, S.R., engaged an outside reading specialist, Lindamood Bell (LMB), to provide four hours daily intensive training to C.K., meaning C.K. missed these hours of school each day.
During his third-grade school year, S.R. continued C.K.’s LMB tutoring during nonschool hours. The district continued to provide 100 minutes a week of reading services. At the end of third grade, his Ohio assessment indicated that C.K. was reading at a third-grade level. The district decided that C.K. was not eligible for extended school year (ESY) and S.R. enrolled C.K. in an LMB summer reading program.
During his fourth-grade year, C.K. regressed. S.R. requested ESY, but the district decided C.K. was not eligible. S.R. enrolled C.K. in LMB for the summer. LMB tutoring, for two hours during the school day each day, continued during C.K.’s fifth-grade year. While it had not done so when he was in second grade, the district counted C.K.’s time during LMB tutoring as unexcused absences.
S.R. filed a due process complaint alleging that the district failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and seeking reimbursement for LMB tutoring from the district. The complaint also questioned the district’s accounting for C.K.’s time away from school for tutoring.
Following a hearing, the impartial hearing officer (IHO) found that the district had provided C.K. with FAPE. He concluded that neither the optimal level of services nor every program requested by parents must be provided in a FAPE. Further, the IHO found insufficient evidence of regression for C.K. to qualify for ESY services. The IHO also found that the district counting C.K.’s tutoring time as unexcused absence was not retaliatory action. S.R. appealed the IHO’s decision.
The state level review officer (SLRO) reversed all of the IHO’s findings. She concluded that any reading progress that C.K. made was wholly as a result of LMB tutoring and that the district’s services alone would have been insufficient to permit C.K. to read at grade level. The SLRO ordered the district to reimburse S.R. for all tutoring expenses from grades two through five, including summer tutoring because the district refused to provide ESY to C.K. She also concluded that, because the district had not marked C.K. as absent when he was attending LMB tutoring in second grade, its decision to do so in fourth grade was retaliatory. The SLRO ordered the district to alter C.K.’s record to show any absences to attend LMB tutoring were excused.
Following the SLRO’s decision, S.R. sought attorney’s fees from the district. The district filed a claim seeking to overturn the SLRO’s decision. Both parties filed motions seeking summary judgment from the district court.
The district court granted the district’s motion, overturned the SLRO’s decision and found that the district did not violate C.K.’s rights under IDEA. The court deferred to the district’s educational expertise regarding the individualized education program. It specifically concluded that it would not defer to the SLRO’s opinion because, in this case, she did not display the requisite educational and legal expertise. In fact, the court concluded that the SLRO made “bizarre and concerning legal errors,” including misquoting the U.S. Supreme Court decision Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, and relying on her misquotes in her decision. The court stated: “Whether the error occurred by an act of intentional bad faith or extreme incompetence, the effect is not a mere citational error.”
It also concluded that the district had waived its right to contest the SLRO’s conclusion that the district retaliated against C.K. and the district must amend C.K.’s attendance record in compliance with the SLRO’s order.
Magistrate recommends that parent’s assertion that school district discriminated against him in an effort to deny him of his parental rights be allowed to proceed.
Bonds v. Berne Union Local Schools, S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-5367 (Feb. 8, 2021), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23210.
https://casetext.com/case/bonds-v-berne-union-local-sch
Todd Bonds, who appeared pro se, instituted an action alleging retaliatory and discriminatory acts related to a custody dispute involving his minor child's mother, Melissa Persinger-Brown, against Berne Union Local (Fairfield) Schools, Principal Craig Heath, Athletic Director Daniel Snively, Superintendent John Parker, Fairfield County Jobs and Family Services (JFS) and JFS Case Worker Leah Armstrong. Bonds charged that Persinger-Brown intentionally conspired with the defendants to deny him visitation and access to his child. His claims arose out of two incidents. First, Bonds alleged that the JFS defendants discriminated against him by intentionally failing to inform him of Persinger-Brown's incarceration, which Bonds alleged denied him of "at least temporary custody of [his] child." Second, Bonds alleged that the school district and its employees racially discriminated against him by refusing to allow him to attend his son's football game.
Bonds sought an order directing JFS and the school district to update their protocols in dealing with noncustodial parents; the immediate termination of Armstrong and Snively, with declarations that they are ineligible for rehire; and the removal of his minor son from Persinger-Brown's custody. He also sought $150,000 per defendant, plus fees, expenses and any other relief to which he may be entitled.
The magistrate conducted an initial screen of the complaint to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Bonds’ complaint, or any portion of it, which was frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or sought monetary relief from a defendant who was immune from such relief.
The magistrate started the analysis by noting that the 11th Amendment of the United States Constitution operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express consent. Defendant JFS, as an "arm of the state," enjoyed sovereign immunity. The court concluded that, because Ohio has not waived its sovereign immunity in federal court, it is entitled to 11th Amendment immunity from suit. The magistrate recommended dismissal of Bonds' claims against defendant JFS.
The magistrate then noted the court’s prior holdings that, under Ohio law, a school district "does not exist and is not sui juris." Instead, it is the board of education of the school district that is the body politic and corporate which is capable of suing and being sued. Bonds affirmatively alleged that Berne Union Local Schools is a school district but is not capable of being sued. The magistrate recommended dismissal of Bonds’ claims against Berne Union Local Schools. However, the magistrate recommended that Bonds be permitted to amend his complaint to the limited extent that he may have actionable claims against the board of education, Armstrong, Parker, Heath and Snively.
Bonds also asserted claims against Armstrong, Parker, Heath and Snively (State Officials), including claims against the State Officials in their official and individual capacities. The magistrate concluded that 42 United States Code 1983 does not permit Bonds to bring his claims against the State Officials in their official capacity. Section 1983 imposes liability only upon a "person" who, under color of law, subjects another person to a deprivation of federal rights. State officials acting in their official capacity are not "persons" under Section 1983. Therefore, to the extent that Bonds brought claims against the State Officials in their official capacities, the magistrate’s recommendation was that those claims were not cognizable.
In order to make a claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege personal involvement of the defendant in causing plaintiff's injury. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the party personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. To establish liability under Section 1983 against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant was personally involved in the conduct that forms the basis of his complaint.
In conclusion, the magistrate recommended that Bonds be permitted to proceed against defendants Persinger-Brown, Armstrong and Snively, but not against Parker and Heath. While Bonds alleged that Persinger-Brown, Armstrong and Snively each personally participated in the incidents from which his complaint arises, he did not allege that Parker and Heath are anything more than witnesses. Therefore, the magistrate concluded that claims against them are not proper under Section 1983.
Court of appeals reverses board of tax appeals decision because it did not take into account an appraisal that used the income capitalization approach for valuation and ignored the statutory language of “as if unencumbered.”
Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2020-Ohio-6938.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2020/2020-Ohio-6938.pdf
Sheffield Crossing Station LLC appealed the Sept. 10, 2019, decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) valuing the subject property, a shopping mall consisting of 10 combined tax parcels with an anchor tenant of Giant Eagle, for tax year 2017, at the Dec. 23, 2015, purchase price of $16,095,000.
The auditor valued the property at approximately $13,693,350 for tax year 2017. Sheffield Crossing filed a decrease complaint with an opinion of value at $11,950,000, and the appellee school board filed a counter-complaint asking the subject to be valued in accordance with the December 2015 sale.
Sheffield Crossing appealed to the BTA. At the hearing, Sheffield Crossing offered the appraisal and testimony of Richard Racek, who valued the subject (in a new appraisal) at $11,250,000 as of Jan. 1, 2017. The Board of Revision offered the appraisal and testimony of Thomas D. Sprout, MAI, who valued the subject at $17,655,000 as of Jan. 1, 2017. No party offered testimony from a person with actual knowledge of the December 2015 sale. Racek valued the property at $11,250,000 using the sales comparison and income capitalization approach and concluded a value of $100 per square foot or $11,368,800, capitalized at 8%. Racek's income approach came to $11,150,000 rounded. He reconciled both approaches to a value of $11,250,000 as of the tax-lien date.
Sprout valued the subject at a combined $17,655,000 using the sales comparison and income capitalization approaches. For his sales comparison approach, Sprout segregated the shopping center into smaller subunits, e.g., the anchor, the in-line retail space, a Cracker Barrel, an Arby's, a BP and an auto service garage. He then compared each subunit using comparable properties. He followed a similar method in his income approach and reconciled each individually
The appeals court noted that this valuation dispute revolved around the 2012 amendment to Ohio Revised Code (RC) 5713.03. Prior to this amendment, a recent arm's-length sale was deemed to have created an irrebuttable presumption of true value, Berea City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2005-Ohio-4979. In 2012, the legislature overrode Berea by inserting the three words "as if unencumbered" into the statute
The appeals court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had concluded that the 2012 amendment to the statute had the effect of legislatively overruling Berea, Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2017-Ohio-4415, ¶ 7. The appeals court quoted Terraza 8: "a recent arm's-length sale price is not conclusive evidence of the true value of property under R.C. 5713.03 as amended by H.B. 487.” It noted that the Supreme Court observed that while "sale price is the best evidence of the property's true value, subject to rebuttal … Market rent becomes relevant only if an opponent presents it as evidence in an attempt to rebut a sale price.”
The court noted that the phrase "as if unencumbered" means that if the property is encumbered, an appraisal should adjust for the effects of those encumbrances and that those adjustments account for market rent and occupancy levels, and not simply to simulate vacancy. The court concluded that the BTA’s opinion did not fully consider the merits of either appraisal. Racek's appraisal specifically valued the property as if it was available for lease for the tax year at issue, and the BTA's decision does not challenge his analysis of the relevant real-estate market and lease rates. Therefore, it was legal error for the BTA to discard Racek's appraisal, and the case is remanded in accordance with this decision. The court reversed the BTA opinion and remanded the matter to the BTA for further proceedings.
Ohio Supreme Court rules that RC 3319.321(B) prohibits the disclosure of school records pertaining to a deceased adult former student unless an exception applies.
State ex rel. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools, 2020-Ohio-5149.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2020/2020-Ohio-5149.pdf
On Aug. 4, 2019, a gunman killed nine people and injured 27 others in a mass shooting in Dayton. Police officers shot and killed the gunman at the scene. The gunman was a 2013 graduate of Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local (Greene) Schools.
On Aug. 4 and 5, 2019, the district received several public records requests from local and national media organizations requesting school records related to the gunman including, but not limited to, disciplinary records. The district denied the requests, stating that the records were exempt from disclosure under Ohio Revised Code (RC) 149.43(A)(1)(v), which applies to records the release of which “is prohibited by state or federal law.” Specifically, the school district identified the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Ohio Student Privacy Act (OSPA) as statutes that exempted the gunman’s records from disclosure.
On Aug. 9, 2019, several media organizations filed an action in the Second District Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus against the school district. The media organizations alleged that they had a clear legal right to inspect the gunman’s records under RC 149.43(B) and that neither FERPA nor OSPA prohibited the district from releasing them. The Second District denied the writ and found that OSPA unambiguously protects an adult former student’s records from disclosure, with no exception for a former student’s death. The media organizations appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that RC 3319.321(B) applied to former students of a public school. The court found that the statutory language prohibiting a person from releasing “personally identifiable information … concerning any student attending a public school” does not mean that the student to whom the information pertains must be presently attending the public school. Instead, the statute is concerned with whether the personally identifiable information at issue relates to an individual’s attendance at the public school. The court found this interpretation to be consistent with FERPA, which mandates that public schools protect the records of both current and former students.
The court also agreed with the lower court and held that the language of RC 3319.321(B) created an applicable exception under RC 149.43(A)(1)(v), regardless of whether the relevant records pertain to an adult former student who has died. RC 3319.321(B) generally prohibits the release of personally identifiable information concerning any student without the written consent of the student’s parent, guardian or custodian or the student himself (if the student is over 18). While the legislature included certain exceptions to that general prohibition, it did not enact an exception for the death of an adult former student. As a result, the court found that the plain language of RC 3319.321(B) prohibited the district from releasing any personally identifiable information about the gunman without his consent.
The court also rejected the argument that applying RC 3319.321(B) to the records of a deceased adult former student was “in derogation of common law.” While there are cases that have found that a person’s common-law privacy rights lapse at death, those cases deal with the existence of a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy. The court held that RC 3319.321(B) does not have an impact on a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy.
As a result, the court found that RC 3319.321(B) prohibits the disclosure of the records sought by the media organizations and the school district correctly denied the public-records request under the OSPA. The court affirmed the Second District’s judgment denying the requested writ of mandamus.
Court allows the production of some but not all records pertaining to student body behavior and affirms the seal of documents that may be public record due to protecting confidential information of elementary school students.
Meyers v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., S.D.Ohio No. 1:17-cv-521, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209562 (Nov. 9, 2020) and Meyers v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., S.D.Ohio No. 1:17-cv-521, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219553 (Nov. 23, 2020).
These are two decisions regarding two separate motions filed by plaintiffs in the same case, involving Gabriel Taye, who had been a third-grade student at Carson Elementary School in the Cincinnati City School District at the time of his death by suicide. The motions were: (1) to compel the production of student records; and (2) for leave to seal student records.
Production of records
The plaintiffs sought to compel the production of four categories of student records: behavior logs for boys in Gabriel’s class; discipline logs for boys in Gabriel’s class; an unredacted discipline chart for all Carson Elementary School students; and discipline records detailing the events described in the discipline logs and chart, all for the academic years of 2014 to 2017. The defendant, Cincinnati Public School District Board of Education (CPS), opposed the productions of these documents as irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ case and because it placed too heavy a burden on CPS.
When one party fails to produce documents requested under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, the other party can file a motion to compel production under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. The material requested must not be privileged, must be relevant to the moving party’s case and cannot be unduly burdensome to the nonmoving party to produce. Here, the plaintiffs had already requested the materials from CPS under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, and now rely on Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 because CPS refused to produce the requested documents.
With regard to the behavior and student-discipline logs, CPS argued that the records were irrelevant, and even if they were relevant, plaintiffs had to overcome a significant burden to compel production because the records were protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). CPS also argued that having to inform parents of the disclosure of their children’s records for a wrongful death suit was overly burdensome and would cause unnecessary anxiety for parents and students. The court found that CPS would not be overly burdened by producing the documents given that they had already produced similar documents for dozens of other students, and the documents were particularly relevant to the case because eight of the 13 students referenced in the complaint remained unidentified. The court also noted that the parties already had a protective order that would adequately protect any confidential student information contained in the documents.
As for the unredacted discipline chart and supporting records, the court found that these documents were not limited to the boys in the deceased student’s class and would invade the privacy of several hundred male and female students at Carson Elementary School. The court found that plaintiffs were not able to show how the requested documents were relevant, that production would lead to discoverable evidence or that the need for the requested documents outweighed the privacy interests of the students involved. The request for such a large number of confidential student records was also found to be overbroad and unduly burdensome on CPS to produce.
In sum, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of the behavior and student-discipline logs but denied the plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of the unredacted discipline chart and supporting records.
File underseal
The plaintiffs were seeking to seal exhibit documents containing confidential student behavior and medical records, protected by FERPA, that were used by the district court in its decision. The plaintiffs also were seeking to have these documents sealed without also filing a redacted version of the documents into the public record.
An appellate court can review a district court’s decision to seal court records for any abuse of discretion, but a party seeking to seal records has a high burden when the relevant documents are part of the public record, because the public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record. The moving party must provide compelling reasons justifying the seal even if the motion to seal the records is unopposed by all parties.
The court found that plaintiffs had a compelling reason to justify the seal, namely the interest in protecting the confidential information and privacy of students involved in the case. The court also noted that there would be no harm to the public interest, because the public has little interest in the confidential information of elementary school students.
While courts and the public interest generally prefer filing of redacted versions of confidential exhibits under seal, the court here agreed with plaintiffs that the filing of redacted versions of the students’ behavior and medical records would not be adequate to protect their privacy.
Appeals court concludes that Ohio Revised Code (RC) 3319.10 does not apply to private employers supplying substitute teachers to public schools.
Adams v. Parallel Emp. Group, 2020-Ohio-6766.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/2/2020/2020-Ohio-6766.pdf
On or about Jan. 1, 2015, the Dayton City Schools Board of Education entered into a contract with Parallel Employment Group, a recruitment and staffing services company, for the purpose of obtaining substitute teachers. Under that contract, Parallel provided a number of substitute teachers to the district in the 2014-15 and 2015-16 school years. While acting as substitute teachers for the district, the substitutes were employed and paid by Parallel.
The substitute teachers sued Parallel, claiming that they should have been compensated according to RC 3319.10 because each of them was assigned to one specific teaching position for more than 60 days. The substitutes sought a writ of mandamus against Parallel, alleging that Parallel was responsible for the performance of a public duty as the “delegee” of the board of education.
The trial court dismissed the substitutes’ petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court concluded that RC 3319.10 does not apply to a private corporation such as Parallel because only a public official or agency could have an obligation to its employees under RC 3319.10.
On review, the court of appeals assumed, without determining, that if the substitutes had been employed by the district, they would have been entitled to the compensation specified in RC 3319.10. However, the court stated that the substitutes had not shown that Parallel had a clear legal duty to compensate them pursuant to RC 3319.10 or that they lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The court noted the substitutes’ argument that Parallel stood in the board’s shoes. The substitutes argued that Parallel owed them a duty because the board of education delegated its authority to hire substitutes to Parallel, meaning that the board delegated its authority to hire and its obligation to compensation substitute teachers.
The court rejected this argument, stated that a writ of mandamus will lie only to permit a private party to compel a public officer to perform an official act the officer is under a clear legal duty to perform. The court stated that the substitutes’ argument that the board had delegated its duty under RC 3319.10 was not unreasonable. However, it held that the substitutes had cited no authority indicating that: (1) a private party can be compelled, through a mandamus action, to fulfill a duty imposed by statute on a public official or agency; or (2) the board was empowered to delegate its authority to hire substitutes or its obligations under RC 3319.10. As a result, the substitutes have not demonstrated that Parallel clearly owes them a duty under RC 3319.10. The court also noted that if the board lacked the statutory authority to hire Parallel to procure the services of substitutes, that would mean that the contract would likely be void. In that case, any delegation of the board’s authority to hire substitute teachers, and its duty to compensate substitute teachers under RC 3319.10, would also be void.
Finally, the appeals court noted that the substitutes had not demonstrated that they have no other remedies in the ordinary course of law. It stated that the substitutes had not demonstrated that they could not bring an action other than mandamus against Parallel or jointly against the board and Parallel or demonstrated that they could not bring an action against the board other than breach of contract.
Ohio court of appeals finds that teacher was not deprived of an adequate remedy at law solely by reason of board’s failure to comply with RC 3319.16’s notice and hearing provisions.
State ex rel. Unterbrink v. Elida Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2020-Ohio-5378.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/3/2020/2020-Ohio-5378.pdf
In 2014, Travis Unterbrink and the Elida Local (Allen) Schools Board of Education entered into a one-year limited teaching contract for the 2014-15 school year. Unterbrink was hired as a middle school music teacher and assistant high school band director. When Unterbrink was first hired, he possessed a four-year Resident Educator license and was entering his third year in Ohio’s Resident Educator Program.
The Ohio Resident Educator Program is a “comprehensive, four-year initiative to assist beginning teachers with mentoring and professional development as they start their education careers.” During the program, teachers must take the Resident Educator Summative Assessment (RESA). Upon successful completion of the RESA, the Leadership Year and other program requirements, teachers in the Resident Educator Program become eligible to apply for a professional teaching license.
At its May 16, 2017, meeting, the board acted to reemploy Unterbrink for the 2017-18 school year, provided that Unterbrink “possess[ed] the appropriate certification as of the first day of July 2017.” On June 1, 2017, Unterbrink learned that he did not receive a passing score on one of the RESA tasks he submitted for scoring. Because Unterbrink did not possess an appropriate teaching license as of July 1, 2017, the board acted to terminate Unterbrink’s limited contract for the 2017-18 school year. Unterbrink’s replacement was subsequently hired by the board.
On Aug. 2, 2017, ODE announced that it was restructuring RESA. ODE determined that, in light of this restructuring, Unterbrink had successfully completed the RESA. In addition, although ODE had earlier denied Unterbrink’s request for an additional one-year extension of his Resident Educator license, ODE purported to give Unterbrink an extension of his license retroactive to July 1, 2017. As a result, Unterbrink requested that the board rescind its action terminating his contract for the 2017-18 school year and reinstate him to his position. The board denied this request. Unterbrink filed a grievance pursuant to the terms of his collective bargaining agreement and on June 19, 2018, an arbitrator denied Unterbrink’s grievance.
On Nov. 28, 2018, Unterbrink filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the trial court. In his petition, Unterbrink argued that he was entitled to a limited contract for the 2017-18 school year because he was properly licensed at all relevant times and had entered into a contract with the board for the 2017-18 school year. In addition, Unterbrink maintained that because the “Board failed and refused to afford [him] any procedural rights under RC 3319.16,” the board’s termination action was void. Unterbrink therefore requested that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus either compelling the board to reinstate his limited teaching contract for the 2017-18 school year or, at minimum, requiring the board to rescind its termination action and follow the statutory termination procedures set forth in RC 3319.16.
On April 3, 2020, the trial court concluded that Unterbrink “had a clear legal right to the procedural protections of RC 3319.16” and that the board had a clear legal duty to provide Unterbrink with the protections afforded by RC 3319.16 because “at the time the board voted to terminate the contract, Unterbrink was a licensed teacher to whom RC 3319.16 applied.” Nevertheless, the trial court held that Unterbrink’s actions clearly demonstrated that he has notice that his teaching contract was terminated, but he took no action to appeal his termination until five months after he had notice of his termination. As a result, the trial court declined to issue a writ.
Unterbrink appealed, aruging that the trial court erred by granting the board’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, he contended that an order of termination from which an appeal can be taken to the court of common pleas comes in only after full compliance with RC 3319.16. Unterbrink argued that he did not have an adequate remedy at law by way of an RC 3319.16 appeal to the court of common pleas because there was no RC 3319.16 order of termination to appeal from. He also argued that he did not have an adequate remedy at law because he did not have actual notice of the board’s termination action to satisfy RC 3319.16’s notice requirement to trigger an appeal to the court of common pleas.
On appeal, the court concluded that if a board of education’s order terminating a teacher’s contract is substantively similar to a final order that can be appealed under RC 2506.01, it is an order of termination appealable under RC 3319.16. In this case, the board voted to terminate Unterbrink’s contract and entered that determination upon its minutes. There was no higher administrative authority to which Unterbrink could have appealed the board’s action. As a result, the board’s action terminating Unterbrink’s teaching contract bore the characteristics of a final order and was an “order of termination” within the meaning of RC 3319.16. The court concluded that Unterbrink was not deprived of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an appeal under RC 3319.16 solely by reason of the board’s failure to comply with RC 3319.16’s notice and hearing provisions. The court also held that the board’s failure to follow RC 3319.16 prior to terminating Unterbrink’s contract would not have itself precluded Unterbrink from using an RC 3319.16 appeal to obtain the relief he sought.
On the issue of whether Unterbrink had actual notice of the board’s termination action, the court agreed with Unterbrink that the phone call he had received from the union president notifying him of the board’s vote to terminate his teaching contract did not satisfy RC 3319.16’s “actual notice” requirement. However, when Unterbrink received an extension of his Resident Education license, he sought reinstatement to his teaching position. In response to this request, the board indicated that it did not intend to reinstate Unterbrink. This letter, the court decided, was sufficient to give actual notice to Unterbrink of the fact that the board had entered an order terminating his teaching contract. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Court denies board’s request to seal a terminated employee’s medical records because of a compelling public interest to view the records as evidence.
Lockhart v. Marietta City Schools, S.D.Ohio No. 2:19-cv-2935 (Oct. 5, 2020), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216263.
https://casetext.com/case/lockhart-v-marietta-city-sch
Melanie Lockhart was employed by the Marietta City School District. In her complaint, she claimed she had an out-of-body experience in which she experienced visions, and the school district, believing she had a mental disability, unlawfully terminated her as a result. The district alleged it based its decision, at least in part, on a medical evaluation Lockhart underwent at its request.
The school district sought the court’s permission to file under seal a report from Lockhart’s Feb. 16, 2018, psychological evaluation that Lockhart sought out herself as a "second opinion." In it, Lockhart recalls the events leading to her lawsuit, including her visions and the school district's subsequent response. It also summarizes the results of several comprehensive tests, provides professional insights into the likely effects of her mental health issues, diagnoses her with several mental health disorders and recommends a course of treatment, including psychotherapy and medication management.
The court confirmed with Lockhart's counsel that she did not oppose this request. To ensure it could conduct a comprehensive inquiry pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's standard for sealing documents, the court directed the district to submit the record to the judge's chambers for in camera review. The court then concluded that the district should not be granted leave to file the second psychological evaluation under seal.
The court noted that, while it may enter a protective order during discovery on a mere showing of "good cause," very different considerations apply when a party seeks to seal documents at the adjudication stage, which is when the parties place material in the court record. Unlike information merely exchanged between the parties, the public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record. For this reason, the moving party has a heavy burden of overcoming a strong presumption in favor of openness as to court records.
In this case, the court found that given the allegations and the content of the medical record, the “public has a strong interest in viewing [this] evidence" outweighing the district's concern over the disclosure of sensitive medical information. The court also noted that it had carefully reviewed the record for sensitive medical information potentially irrelevant to the issues in this case and found none. And as Lockhart's personally identifying information was already redacted, the court found no basis to further redact the document.
Court finds teacher termination was subject to the CBA’s grievance procedure based on language contained in the contract’s arbitration section.
Niles Edn. Assn. v. Niles City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2020 Ohio 6804.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2020/2020-Ohio-6804.pdf
In October 2017, Christopher Chieffo reported off work at the Niles City School District via a request for sick leave. According to the board, Chieffo attended a golf tournament on that day, where he coached the golf team of another school district.
On Jan. 17, 2018, the district's superintendent sent Chieffo written notice of a pretermination hearing scheduled for the next day. The superintendent wrote that the hearing was necessitated by her intention to consider recommending to the board that it initiate proceedings to terminate Chieffo’s contract with the district for good and just cause under Ohio Revised Code (RC) 3319.16 as a result of Chieffo's alleged misuse and falsification of sick leave during the fall of the 2017-18 school year.
Prior to the pretermination hearing, the board's legal counsel sent to Chieffo's legal counsel a draft resolution fully specifying "the grounds for which consideration to recommend initiation of termination proceedings is based." Following the pretermination hearing, the superintendent provided written notice of her intention to recommend to the board that Chieffo's employment contract "be terminated for cause in accordance with RC 3319.16" at a meeting scheduled for that evening.
The board subsequently adopted a resolution alleging that Chieffo "knowingly and willingly misused and falsified sick leave" in violation of: (1) a specific board policy; (2) article V (Leaves), section 5.02 (Sick Leave), subsections 5.024 and 5.025 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA); (3) RC 3319.141; and (4) the Ohio Department of Education's Code for Professional Conduct. The board resolution also suspended Chieffo's employment without pay or benefits effective the next day and indicated that the board intended to initiate proceedings to consider the termination of Chieffo's employment contract. Chieffo then challenged the board’s actions both on a statutory basis and as a grievance, simultaneously.
Chieffo sent a letter to the superintendent demanding a private hearing before a referee, writing that he did not waive and specifically reserved his rights "to grieve and arbitrate the termination through the collective bargaining agreement." The board then sent a request to the Superintendent of Public Instruction requesting a list of referees, scheduled a hearing date and sent notice to Chieffo. The state provided a list of potential referees, and the parties mutually agreed on the appointment of a particular referee. The parties agreed to hold the hearing in May 2018, which was later rescheduled for December.
Additionally, the teacher’s association and Chieffo filed a grievance alleging that the board violated, misinterpreted and/or misapplied the CBA when it initiated termination proceedings against Chieffo and suspended him without pay pending termination without just cause at the Jan. 18, 2018, school board meeting.
The board's counsel subsequently challenged the arbitrability of the grievance. The parties ultimately agreed to put both the statutory hearing and the arbitration on hold so that the teacher’s association and Chieffo could seek declaratory judgment in the trial court on the issue of arbitrability.
The trial court issued a judgment entry granting the board's motion for summary judgment and denying the teacher’s association's and Chieffo's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that termination was specifically excluded from the CBA's disciplinary process that provides for arbitration. Therefore, it held that the termination process was reserved to the statutory provisions of RC 3319.16. The trial court concluded that Chieffo's grievance regarding his termination as a teacher was not an issue for arbitration under the CBA and issued a summary judgment in favor of the board.
The teacher’s association appealed, alleging the lower court’s decision was “erroneous.” The appellate court determined that the issue to be decided was whether Chieffo's grievance, alleging that the board violated, misinterpreted and/or misapplied the CBA when, without good cause, it initiated termination proceedings and suspended him without pay was arbitrable. The appeals court overturned the trial court’s decision, finding in favor of the board.
The appellate court found Chieffo’s grievance was in fact arbitrable under the CBA and that the trial court committed an error by determining the issue of arbitrability based on the scope of a substantive provision in the CBA rather than the scope of the arbitration provision. It found additional errors by the trial court in granting the board’s motion for a summary judgment and denying the teacher’s association’s and Chieffo’s motions for summary judgment. The case was then remanded for the trial court to enter a summary judgment consistent with this ruling.