School Law Summary 2021-4
In this issue: COVID-19 litigation • Board of Education-Authority • Individuals With Disabilities • School Construction • Open Meetings Act • Political Subdivision Immunity • Tax Valuation
Eastern district court of Tennessee denies school board’s motion to alter judgment after court orders board to enforce a mask mandate.
S.B. v. Lee, E.D.Tenn. No. 3:21-CV-00317-JRG-DCP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199552 (Oct. 18, 2021).
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/61768ad9b50db91f1e5ebb5c
On Aug. 16, 2021, the governor of Tennessee issued an executive order that gave parents the right to opt out of any order or requirement for a student to wear a face covering at school, on a school bus or at school functions, by notifying the local education agency or personnel at the student’s school. Not long afterwards, the Knox County Board of Education met to discuss and vote on a districtwide mask mandate for its school system. Although the board had adopted a mask mandate for the entirety of the 2020-21 school year, the board decided not to renew the mask mandate for the 2021-22 school year.
Following the board’s vote, several families filed a class-action lawsuit against the district, claiming that the board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by not providing them with a reasonable accommodation that would enable them to have safe and “fundamental access to the school building” during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the board to enforce the mask mandate that was in effect during the 2020-21 school year as a reasonable accommodation under ADA. The board filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a court to alter or amend a judgment based on: 1) a clear error in law; 2) newly discovered evidence; 3) an intervening change in controlling law; or 4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.
The board stated that it had new evidence establishing that the court’s mask mandate was causing it to suffer an undue burden because 700 students and 16 staff members refused to wear masks since the court’s mask mandate went into effect. Of the 16 staff members, 10 were teachers who were “were sent home without pay.” The board asserted that the court’s mask mandate negatively impacted the educational rights of some students and that “parental and student resistance … will continue.”
The court found that the board failed to any legal grounds by which the court could determine that the mask mandate caused the district to endure an undue administrative burden and that this failure to cite legal authority was fatal to its motion. The court found that the circumstances the board described to the court were not meaningfully different from the circumstances that it envisioned and prepared for during the prior year’s voluntary mask mandate. The court also highlighted the fact that only a fraction of the district’s staff and students — less than 1% — were not complying with the court’s mask mandate. The court found no evidence that the mask mandate was causing the district to grapple with a burden of undue proportions.
The board next maintained that the court committed a clear error of law by issuing a preliminary injunction because the board “has taken no action to bar or prevent plaintiffs from accessing their buildings.” However, the court found that the board too casually described the issue that was before the court and that the issue was not access to the schools in general but safe access in light of the plaintiffs’ unique needs. The court found that the evidence demonstrated that the accommodations that the board had in place against COVID-19 were not reasonable because they were ineffective and rejected the board’s use of Rule 59(e) as an attempt to relitigate the reasonableness of those accommodations.
Finally, the board reiterated its prior argument that it was already providing plaintiffs with a reasonable accommodation in the form of virtual schooling and that the mask mandate was therefore improper. The court highlighted key differences between brick-and-mortar schools and virtual schools and reiterated its conclusion that the evidence raised questions about the merits of litigating on the issue of whether virtual schooling was a reasonable alternative for plaintiffs.
In sum, the court identified no cognizable basis for relief under Rule 59(e) and denied the district’s motion.
Northern district court of Ohio denies parent’s request for TRO after district implements a mask mandate for all students, teachers and faculty.
P.M. v. Mayfield City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Edn., N.D.Ohio No. 1:21 CV 1711, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1727703 (Sept. 13, 2021).
https://casetext.com/case/pm-v-mayfield-city-sch-dist-bd-of-educ
On Sept. 3, 2020, the Mayfield City School District Board of Education adopted a policy that allowed the board to require students to wear face masks unless they were unable to do so for a health or developmental reason. On Aug. 20, 2021, the superintendent and the board used the policy to implement a mask mandate for all students, teachers and faculty. A resident of Mayfield whose child attends Mayfield City Schools filed a complaint against the district and requested a temporary restraining order (TRO), arguing that the district’s policy caused immediate and irreparable harm to the students, staff and community.
In reviewing a motion for a TRO, a court must consider and balance the following four factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order failed all four factors and was not well-taken.
First, the court found that the plaintiff did not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the claim. Although the plaintiff alleged a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, the court did not see where plaintiff had been denied a life, liberty, property or fundamental right, nor how wearing a mask impeded her child’s property interest in school attendance. Additionally, the court questioned whether the plaintiff even had standing to bring the case since she was appearing pro se on behalf of her minor child. Although the court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s case on these grounds, the court did find that the plaintiff’s lack of standing served as an additional basis on which plaintiff’s claim was not likely to succeed on the merits.
Next, the court found that plaintiff failed to show how enjoining the district’s policy would cause her child irreparable harm. The plaintiff did not establish any immediate or actual harm to her child from the policy or any evidence that wearing a mask was an unsafe or hazardous practice. The court noted that the district’s policy provided an exemption to students who could not wear the mask for health or developmental reasons.
Finally, the court found that the mask mandate was implemented to prevent serious injury, illness and death in the district and broader community and that enjoining the district’s mask policy would potentially cause substantial harm to the district’s students, teachers and faculty through community spread of COVID-19, which could potentially cause serious illness and death. The court also found that based on the high potential of contracting COVID-19, the public interest would not be served by enjoining the mask mandate. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff’s motion failed all four prongs of the standard for a temporary restraining order and denied the plaintiff’s motion.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rules that mask mandate did not violate the Free Exercise clause as the order was neutral and of general applicability.
Resurrection Sch. V. Hertel, 6th Cir.No. 20-2256, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25349 (Aug. 23, 2021).
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0191p-06.pdf
To control the spread of COVID-19, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services required that all persons five years of age and older wear a mask in indoor public settings, including while attending public and private K-12 schools. A Catholic elementary schools in Lansing, Michigan, and two parents with children enrolled at the school challenged the mask requirement as a violation of their free exercise of religion, equal protection and substantive due process rights.
Among other things, the parents alleged that the children found the masks uncomfortable and distracting from their religious education; that the mask requirement conflicted with their rights as a parent to choose a school for their children that corresponded to their own convictions; that wearing a mask in the classroom interfered with their children’s ability to engage in their elementary school classroom and its Catholic, religious teachings; and that wearing a mask negatively impacted their children’s focus and diverted their attention away from the lesson taught in class.
The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing the mask order against Resurrection School and the other plaintiffs. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, concluding that plaintiffs could not establish that they would experience irreparable harm without the order. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, which the court dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision and concluded that because the requirement to wear a facial covering applied to students in grades K-five at both religious and nonreligious schools, it was neutral and of general applicability. The court relied on the “familiar framework for free-exercise claims,” and found that where a challenged law is neutral and of general applicability and has merely an “incidental effect” on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, the defendants do not need to show a compelling governmental interest.
The court found that the Michigan orders were not so riddled with secular exceptions as to fail to be neutral and generally applicable. Instead, the exceptions to the order were narrow and discrete. Many of the exceptions, such as medical intolerance to mask use, eating and drinking, swimming or receiving a medical treatment during which a mask cannot be worn, were “inherently incompatible” with wearing a mask. The court also highlighted that the exemptions were available for everyone regardless of their religious beliefs.
The court found that the orders were rationally related to a legitimate government interest — i.e. controlling the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan. Further the court highlighted that the defendants cited more than ample evidence that requiring masks in the school setting minimized the spread of COVID-19. As a result, the court concluded that the Michigan orders did not violate the Free Exercise clause because they were of neutral and of general applicability and satisfied rational-basis review.
Appeals court dismisses as moot motion for preliminary injunction to block enforcement of a school board resolution to operate school remotely because it had expired by its terms.
Doe v. Upper Arlington Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-3805.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2021/2021-Ohio-3805.pdf
In August 2020, several students in the Upper Arlington City School District sued the board of education and its members, as well as the superintendent, challenging the board’s plans to begin the 2020-21 school year with no option for in-person instruction. The students sought a preliminary injunction to compel an optional in-person mode of instruction. In the intervening months since the motion was originally filed, all the other plaintiffs dropped out leaving John Doe 1 as the only plaintiff.
In a final order of Jan. 6, 2021, the trial court denied Doe’s motion for preliminary injunction. Doe appealed on Jan. 28. On Feb. 12, 2021, the board voted to return to in-person instruction five days a week beginning on March 1, 2021. In an appellate brief filed on Feb. 24, 2021, Doe argued that the court erred when it denied his motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the Ohio Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to a basic minimum education.
The appeals court concluded that the matter was moot. It noted that the school Doe attended has been back in session with in-person instruction since before the end of the last school year, that the legislative enactment that the board used to offer remote instruction has ended, and that the board’s July 31, 2020, resolution had expired. It also noted that the claim was not likely to recur during Doe’s remaining time in the district and that the issues that Doe raised were not destined to evade review. Based on mootness, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded to the court of common pleas.
District court magistrate recommends dismissing, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, family’s claim that school district failed to provide FAPE while district was offering remote instruction.
R.Z. v. Cincinnati Public Schools, S.D.Ohio No. 1:21-cv-10, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149575 (Aug. 10, 2021).
R.Z., a student at Walnut Hills High School in the Cincinnati Public School District, was identified as a student with disabilities. R.Z., with cancer-associated cognitive impairment and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had an individualized education program (IEP). During parts of the 2019-20 and 2020-21 school years, Walnut Hills operated with remote learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
R.Z. and his parent sued the district alleging that it failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during remote instruction, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The family also alleged that the district violated Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Ohio law. The district filed a motion to dismiss the claims because the family failed to exhaust administrative remedies under IDEA.
The magistrate relied on the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools (SLS 2021-3), which examined the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (SLS 2017-2). The Fry court concluded that a student who brings a claim that does not involve a denial of FAPE or other issues under IDEA is not required to exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies before the claim can proceed.
The magistrate stated that, unlike the claim in Fry, R.Z.’s claim was based on the denial of FAPE. For that reason, the magistrate followed Perez, which “emphasized the mandatory nature of IDEA exhaustion for any suit that ‘concerns’ the denial of a FAPE.” Because R.Z.’s family brought claims that challenged both the adequacy of his IEP during remote learning and the implementation of his existing IEP, the magistrate reasoned that the best place for the required fact-intensive inquiry was through the administrative process. Determining a remedy when a school has failed to implement an IEP should be done at the administrative level. The magistrate specifically concluded that the exhaustion of remedies would not be futile, even though the Perez court suggested that the IDEA does not have a futility exception.
The court also considered R.Z.’s argument that the claim was brought in federal court because the administrative process is prolonged and burdensome. The magistrate concluded that concerns about potential delays do not provide grounds for expanding the carefully defined narrow grounds that a plaintiff must demonstrate to prove the existence of an exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The magistrate also determined that allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint would not change the fact that the crux of the complaint concerned a denial of FAPE. As a result, the magistrate recommended denying the family’s motion to amend its complaint and granting the district’s motion to dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Appellate court concludes parent of student who will attend school in a new building has no legally protectable interest allowing her to intervene in a case involving a zoning variance for the building.
Upper Arlington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. City of Upper Arlington Bldg. Dept., 2021-Ohio-3718.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2021/2021-Ohio-3718.pdf
The board of education for the Upper Arlington City School District hired an architect to design a new elementary school. The board accepted a school design with single-occupant toilet rooms with floor-to-ceiling walls and solid, full-frame lockable doors, which could be used by either sex. The design also had a communal lavatory for use by any students. The Upper Arlington Building Department partially approved the school design but stated that some items, including the bathrooms, were nonconforming. It cited building code requirements that separate restroom facilities must be provided for each sex, labeled on the plans with correct signs provided.
The school board appealed to the board of building appeal (BBA) and, as an alternative, requested a variance from the state building code. The BBA upheld the finding of noncompliance and did not issue the variance. The board appealed the BBA’s decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, asking that the trial court either “determine as a matter of fact and law that the proposed design of the School is a fair interpretation or application” of the building code or order the BBA to grant a variance. The school board and the city filed a joint motion for summary judgment granting the variance to allow the proposed bathroom design. The parties agreed that single-occupancy toilet rooms identified for use by either sex are not against the public interest.
The trial court granted the parties’ joint motion for summary judgment, stating that a literal enforcement of the building code as applied to the district’s bathroom design would result in an unnecessary hardship. It also noted that the international building code has been amended to allow unisex single-user toilet rooms. It remanded the case to the BBA with an order to issue the requested variance.
Within 30 days of this decision, a resident in the district whose son was a kindergarten student who would attend the new school filed a motion to intervene and a motion for relief from judgment. She cited her son’s attendance at the school as evidence of her personal interest in the matter. The trial court granted the parent’s motion to intervene, stating that motion was timely because it was filed within 30 days after the summary judgment ruling. It concluded that the parent had a personal interest because of her son’s attendance at the school, concluded that she had standing and granted her motion for relief from judgment. The court concluded that it had been procedurally improper to grant the parties’ joint motion because it circumvented the normal procedure for administrative appeals, making it void ab initio, and vacated the judgment as a legal nullity. The school board appealed both the court’s decision to allow the parent to intervene and its decision to vacate the judgment. It argued that the parent had no legally protectable interest, that she lacked standing to participate in the administrative appeal and that she did not qualify as a party under the law.
The appeals court concluded that the parent failed to articulate any direct, substantial or legally protectible interest. It held that the trial court’s granting of the parent’s motion based on her personal interest as the parent of a student at the school was unreasonable. The court also noted that the parent had failed to attach a pleading to her motion setting forth the claim or defense for intervention.
Regarding the trial court’s decision to vacate its judgment on the joint motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that any procedural errors of the court did not render the judgment void, but voidable. Only a judgment rendered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Because a court has no inherent authority to vacate voidable judgments, the appeals court concluded that the trial court erred when it vacated its entry of summary judgment. The matter was remanded to the trail court for proceedings consistent with the appeals court’s order.
Court determines school district’s Open Meetings Act violation rendered moot as any possible remedy was foreclosed by the passage of time.
State ex rel. Crilley v. Lowellville Bd. of Educ., 2021-Ohio-3333
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/7/2021/2021-Ohio-3333.pdf
Crilley appealed a decision by the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas that found the Lowellville Board of Education violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act (OMA), Ohio Revised Code (RC) 121.22, by failing to provide the requisite statutory notice of a special meeting of the board on Aug. 10, 2020. The trial court also issued an injunction ordering the board to “formulate, adopt, and abide by a rule consistent with R.C. 121.22(F) whereby any person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings,” and awarded a civil forfeiture in the amount of $500, plus costs to Crilley.
However, the trial court denied Crilley’s request for statutory attorney’s fees and declaratory relief. Specifically, it declined to invalidate and declare null and void a resolution by the board that adopted an amended school reopening plan at the special meeting on Aug. 10, 2020. The trial court reasoned that a prior resolution of the board, which adopted the superintendent’s original reopening plan on July 27, 2020, vested complete discretion in the superintendent to alter or amend the original reopening plan at any time prior to or during the 2020-21 school year.
Crilley appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the original reopening plan vested complete discretion in the superintendent to alter or amend the original plan. Crilley asserts that the July 27, 2020, meeting, in which the board vested complete discretion in the superintendent, was conducted in violation of the OMA, despite the fact that no OMA challenge to the July 27, 2020, special meeting was alleged in the original complaint. In his second assignment of error, Crilley further alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to articulate any rationale to support the decision to deny him attorney’s fees.
At the Aug. 10 meeting, the board immediately moved into executive session for the stated purpose of the potential employment of a cafeteria worker. However, after the 2.5-hour executive session, the board returned to open session and adopted four resolutions in three minutes, one of which was a unanimous resolution to approve remote learning for the first nine weeks of the 2020-21 school year.
The trail court noted that the “rule” which the board follows regarding the manner in which it provides notice of special meeting actually is silent as to any method or manner of notifying the general public of the time, place, and purpose of special meetings. While the board submitted evidence regarding the practices which the board ordinarily adopts to provide notice to the public, its notice is subject to uncertainty and inconsistent application which the legislature intended to avoid in enacting RC 121.22. Furthermore, by failing to notify the print media of the purpose of their special meetings, the board also acted in derogation of the statute. The trial court then concluded that the special meeting conducted Aug. 10, 2020 was held in violation of OMA.
Under ordinary circumstances the court would declare the action of the board in “approving” the decision of the superintendent to adopt remote learning at that special meeting to be invalid pursuant to RC 121.22(H). However, in this situation the “reopening Plan” approved by the board on July 27, 2020, vested the superintendent with the sole, unfettered discretion to adopt a remote learning plan without any further board approval. Therefore, any “action” taken by the board regarding the superintendent’s decision was without any legal significance at all. The court held that the decision of the superintendent to adopt a remote learning plan for the first nine weeks of the school year was a legitimate exercise of this power and will not be disturbed by the court. The court also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party and awarded statutory damages for the RC 121.22 violation in the amount of $500.
CriIley asserted two assignments of error: that the trial court erred by not invalidating the school’s reopening plan and that the trail court erred by not awarding him attorney’s fees The appeals court perfunctorily addressed both by noting that invalidating the reopening plan was a moot issue since more than nine weeks had passed but, because the court offered no rationale as to why it did not award attorney’s fees, it remanded the case back to the trail court with instructions to apply a two-part statutory test found in RC 121.22(I)(2)(a) to resolve that issue.
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY
Doe v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 3297, 2021 WL 4391234 (Ohio Ct. App., Lawrence County August 26, 2021)
This is an appeal that arose from allegations of inappropriate sexual contact between a Fairland High School (FHS) Spanish teacher, Amy Adkins (fka Lugones), and student Doe, a 15-year-old student. During the 2017-18 school year, Adkins seduced the student through text messages, the internet and physical contact. On Saturday, April 7, 2018, the relationship culminated in sexual intercourse.
The trial court overruled appellants' motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. In their two assignments of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of political subdivision immunity.
Revised Code (RC) Chapter 2744 establishes a three-step analysis to determine whether a political subdivision is immune from liability. First, RC 2744.02(A)(1) sets forth the general rule that a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision. Once the political subdivision demonstrates that it is immune from tort liability under RC 2744.02(A)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden to show that one of the RC 2744.02(B) exceptions applies and removes the general grant of immunity. If the plaintiff establishes that one of the RC 2744.02(B) exceptions applies, then the political subdivision may assert one of the RC 2744.03(A) defenses to reinstate immunity.
The appellee argued that the facts fit an exception in RC 2744.02(B), however the court reiterated public schools are governmental functions and not proprietary functions. Further, this case does not fit in the category of physical defect. Also, no other section of the revised code expressly posed liability, so the court ruled in favor of the school district and determined the case to remanded to the lower court for determination consistent with this opinion.
Appeals court finds board of revision’s valuation of property based on recent sale as best evidence of true value.
Amherst Marketplace Station, LLC v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2021-Ohio-3866
Amherst Marketplace is the owner of commercial property in Lorain County that is occupied by a Giant Eagle grocery store with two smaller spaces leased by other businesses. Amherst Marketplace filed a complaint with the Lorain County Board of Revision requesting a reduction in the taxable value of the property as of Jan. 1, 2017, alleging that the auditor’s valuation of the property exceeded the fair market value. The Amherst Exempted Village School District Board of Education filed a countercomplaint requesting an increase in the taxable value, arguing that a recent sale in an arms-length transaction best reflected the fair market value of the property.
During the initial hearing, Amherst Marketplace submitted an appraisal that valued the property at $4,730,000 as of Jan. 1, 2015. The appraiser acknowledged that the property was purchased in 2015 for $11,655,000 but appraised the property as if it was not subject to the existing Giant Eagle lease. An appraisal submitted by the auditor took the existing lease with Giant Eagle into consideration and valued the property at $11,300,000. The board of education introduced documentation establishing the recent sale price of $11,655,000. The board of revision concluded that the recent sales price reflected the fair market value and adjusted the valuation accordingly.
Amherst Marketplace appealed to the board of tax appeals (BTA), arguing that Revised Code (RC) 5713.03 required valuation of the property as if it were unencumbered by a lease. The board of education argued that under the same statute, a recent sale remained the best evidence of fair market value even when the property was encumbered by a lease at the time of sale and maintained that Amherst Marketplace had not rebutted that presumption.
The BTA upheld the determination of value by the board of revision, noting the maxim that the best evidence of a property’s true value is a recent sale in an arm’s-length transaction. Noting that the party who opposes the sale as best evidence bears the burden of rebutting that evidence, the BTA concluded that Amherst Marketplace had articulated legal arguments regarding the sale of leased properties but had not offered evidence to rebut the presumption. Amherst Marketplace then appealed the BTA valuation of $11,655,000 to the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Appeals.
Amherst Marketplace raised 17 assignments of error in its appeal, which the court rearranged and combined for the purposes of disposition. Most noteworthy was an argument advanced by Amherst Marketplace that a hypothetical vacant-at-transfer sale methodology is required for determining the true value of property, citing Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. Of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2798. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the argument that an appraisal that relied upon comparable properties subject to first-generation leases without downward adjustment in the sales prices to account for lease terms was not competent evidence of value. Addressing a situation in which there was no recent arm’s-length sale to establish the presumptive value of a property, the court concluded that “an appraisal that takes into account a lease with terms that are typical for the market may be considered and adopted.”
Because the court declined to adopt a vacant-at-transfer rule and concluded that an appraisal methodology that relies on market-lease terms is competent evidence of value, it follows that the language of RC 5713.03 did not require the BTA to reject the highest and best use advocated by the Amherst Marketplace in this case. Similarly, an appraiser is not required to assume that a property is vacant at the time of sale or to make property-rights adjustments for existing leases. Ultimately, the court rejected all of Amherst Marketplace’s assignments of error and affirmed the $11,655,000 valuation.